







MANAGEMENT -AN EMPIRICAL ANAL YSIS OF





Principal Advisor: Stephen Mehay
Thesis




REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved
OMBNo. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1 21 5 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to
the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
March 1997
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
PROMOTION POLICIES AND CAREER MANAGEMENT - AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF BELOW-ZONE PROMOTION OF U.S. NAVY OFFICERS
6. AUTHOR(S)
LtCol (WEN) Napoleon E. Rivero, CDR (GEN) Holger Schluter
5. FUNDING NUMBERS





9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the selection and promotion of officers in the U.S. Navy. This thesis develops multivariate
models to estimate the effects of 'below-zone' early promotion on the career of officers and attempts to determine
whether below-zone selection puts Navy officers on the fast-track for later promotion or whether, instead, it increases
the probability that their subsequent career will stagnate. Outcome variables include: performance on fitness reports,
screen for command:, and promotion to the ranks of Commander (0-5) and Captain (0-6). Using data from the Navy
Officer Promotion History Files, the thesis analyzed officers appearing before their respective promotion board between
fiscal years 1986 and 1995. The data sets were further categorized into three major URL warfare communities
(submarine, surface and aviation).
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and maximum likelihood logit regression models are employed to estimate the prob-
ability of being promoted, to screen for command, or having high fitness report scores in comparison to officers selected
in-zone. The findings do not reveal evidence that officers earlier promoted below-zone incur later disadvantages in com-
parison to their fellow in-zone selected officers.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Navy Policies, Officer's Career, Promotion, Career Management, Below-Zone Promotion, Early
Promotion, Deep Selection,















NSN 7540-0 1-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
11
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
PROMOTION POLICIES AND CAREER MANAGEMENT - AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF BELOW-ZONE PROMOTION OF U.S. NAVY OFFICERS
Napoleon E. Rivero
Lieutenant Colonel , Venezuelan National Guard
B.S
,
Venezuelan National Guard Academy, 1981
Holger Schliiter
Commander , German Navy
M.S.
,
University ofHamburg Germany, 1985
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of








This thesis investigates the selection and promotion of officers in the U.S. Navy.
This thesis develops multivariate models to estimate the effects of 'below-zone' early
promotion on the career of officers and attempts to determine whether below-zone selec-
tion puts Navy officers on the fast-track for later promotion or whether, instead, it in-
creases the probability that their subsequent career will stagnate. Outcome variables in-
clude: performance on fitness reports, screen for command, and promotion to the ranks
of Commander (0-5) and Captain (0-6). Using data from the Navy Officer Promotion
History Files, the thesis analyzed officers appearing before their respective promotion
board between fiscal years 1986 and 1995. The data sets were further categorized into
three major URL warfare communities (submarine, surface and aviation).
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and maximum likelihood logit regression models
are employed to estimate the probability of being promoted, to screen for command, or
having high fitness report scores in comparison to officers selected in-zone. The findings
do not reveal evidence that officers earlier promoted below-zone incur later disadvan-
tages in comparison to their fellow in-zone selected officers. Recommendations for fur-
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A. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This thesis focuses on the selection and promotion of officers in the U.S. Navy. It
discusses the purpose and success of "fast-track" and "below-zone" promotions and their
value to an organization. The thesis analyzes the effects of below-zone promotion on the
careers of officers and attempts to determine whether it puts Navy officers on the fast-
track for later promotion or, instead, leads to voluntary departures from the Navy or to
stagnation in subsequent careers. For example, do those who select early later experience
lower fitness report (FITREP) scores or lower administrative screen rates because their
length of service is junior to the rest of their new cohort? Also, do FITREP rankings and
promotion recommendation practices reward performance or longevity ? The data are
derived from the Navy Officer Promotion History files provided by Drs. Stephen Mehay
(Naval Postgraduate School) and Prof. William Bowman (Naval Academy) from original
Navy Bureau of Personnel records. This thesis will discuss the theoretical aspects of
early promotion in civilian venues and will apply them to possible effects on personnel
issues in the U.S. Navy.
The practice of early promotions (or fast-track promotions) 1 are commonplace in
the civilian world (external labor market) and in the military (an internal labor market)
1
"Below-zone" promotion means that an officer is considered for promotion junior to officers who are
"in-zone"
,
who are considered eligible in the active duty list of their respective cohort. This common
terminology will be found in several different terms: Deep selection, early promotion or fast-track
promotion. The latter is common lingo of labor economics. Throughout this thesis the military terms will be
used interchangeably, "fast-track promotion" will be used as term in a labor economics context.
because they put the most capable workers into leadership positions early and increase
the amount of time they can stay in high-ranking positions before legal retirement. In the
military, deep-selection for fast-track promotions results in selection of the very best
officers, those who are 'head and shoulders' 2 above their peer group.
Nothing is more vital to the U.S. than the maintenance of highest
leadership available in all fields of endeavor.
This applies to the US Navy, as well as to government, industry and the economy as a
whole. Many aspects of this phenomenon applicable to the Navy are also found in the
civilian labor market, as the Navy's personnel system is characterized as an "internal
labor market":
A high proportion of those in higher paid jobs have been promoted from
lower paid jobs within the same organization, and new entrants are for the
most part appointed only at specific points in the hierarchy, these are the
characteristics of the internal labor market structure documented by
Doeringer and Piore (Malcolmson, 1971, p. 488).
It is important to acknowledge the difference between the two labor market
concepts, however, the Navy's remedies for below-zone promotion problems are
not always different from possible measures in the corporate world.
The Secretary of the Navy Mr. Charles Thomas used the phrase 'head and shoulders' and proposed rapid
advancement in a letter to the President. L.S. Sabin, "Deep Selection," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
86:3, March 1960, p.46 in: J.C. Mape, "A method to Improve the Selection of Naval Officers for Early
Promotion", U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Master's Thesis, Monterey, California 1964.
B. THE CURRENTSITUATION
After the cold war ended, the U.S. Navy underwent many changes. With the
drawdown, the reduction of the budget, and the new challenges of different kinds of war
scenarios, manpower structures and policies had to be adjusted.
The current statutory procedures governing the promotion of officers on the
active duty list are embodied in Title 10 of the US Code. These procedures evolved from
the consolidation of separate statutory provisions of the military services when the
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, or DOPMA, was enacted in 1980 (and still
in force after 1989). The DOPMA not only consolidated but, to a large extent,
standardized the procedures the military services must follow in selecting officers for
promotion.
It is difficult to deny the fact that the present selection system is highly successful.
In general, this system has enjoyed the confidence of the officers themselves, who
realize that only the most able should be permitted to advance up the promotion ladder.
The determination of those "best fit" is based primarily upon the "Report on the Fitness
of Officers," the most valuable source of information in each officer's official record. As
will be seen, the information readily available from a fitness report does not always
contain a high degree of validity required by a selection board. In addition to machine
readable information used in this thesis, specific text on the "back-side" is used by
promotion board members when evaluating officers. This written information is not
available for this research study. This dilemma exists in every selection, but is intensified
in the process of selection for early promotion, as the policy of early promotion requires
the board to select those whose performance is exemplary.
The Navy, by permitting early selection, recognizes the fact that in general, there
will be within each year group a small percentage of officers who are "head and
shoulders" above the rest of the group. It is to the Navy's advantage to rapidly promote
such individuals in order to utilize their abilities more efficiently.
In terms of early promotion, downsizing of the Navy has led to a dilemma in
selecting future leaders and developing attractive career patterns. Although a smaller
Navy has fewer opportunities for long-term careers and appears to be less attractive for
new entrants, a large number of accessions still are needed to meet continuing challenges
in high technology and demanding warfare areas and scenarios. What if downsizing
reduces equal proportions in all grades ? Then downsizing is no real change in promotion
probabilities. It only occurs when the reduction of O-6's is higher than those of 0-1 to
O-3's. So the Navy has to select its future leaders from a smaller number of available
officers, but a higher competition occurs only when downsizing is not equally
proportioned.
But, still, in a smaller Navy, the same requirements imposed on an officer remain
despite the changing tasks of today's military. In a smaller Navy with more demanding
jobs, one can expect the requirements on officers seeking promotions to be even greater.
The career patterns and the 'tickets to punch' are still in force and lay a burden on young
officers who are looking forward to a career.
'What have we done to ourselves?' asks Vice Admiral Skip Bowman,
Chief of Naval Personnel. He refers to a frenzy of ticket punching sparked
by legislated and service-driven requirements, stiffer competition for
command and new technologies. . . Admiral Bowman and his staff have
been examining ways to manage officer careers better. . . [A]t the same
time, the very brightest officers are not being moved fast enough into
assignments that best serve the Navy's needs (Philpott, 1996, pp. 50-55).
Several requirements in an officer's career highlight the importance of early
promotion:
- The Goldwater-Nichols^Act of 1986 mandated that every officer serve in a joint duty
billet before he can reach flag rank. In order to qualify for joint duty billets, an officer
must have the requisite joint education or experience.
- The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 has not changed. 3
- The acquisition of full-time graduate education for officers (in order to meet the
challenging technology and managerial environments of the future) takes at least two
years off a career pattern. However, it is desperately needed under the competitive
environment with other services and under joint duty.
The Navy itself requires standardized steps to acquire command: from department
head to XO, XO to CO, while including graduate education, joint tours and a Washington
tour.
To win this race against time, a system of early promotions is needed to increase
the flow of personnel into the flag or command billets in a reasonable time. Early
promotion is a tool to meet the Navy's demand for personnel with exemplary
performance records and to sort them into high-level positions earlier so they can realize
' The DOPMA restricts the time on active duty for officers by rank and length of service unless a waiver is
granted by the President or the Defense Secretary
longer than the current 5.8 years in flag rank before retirement. Four-Star Admirals serve
in 3.2 flag assignments over 6.2 years (Philpott, 1996). The percentage of deep selectees
in the Navy ranges from 1.6 percent (Lieutenant Commanders) to 3.5 percent (Captains).
The Navy wants to raise the figure to 1 5 percent. A raise in the DOPMA ceilings is an
objective, too (Philpott, 1996, pp. 50-55). Apparently, the need for early promotion is
increasing in the U.S. Navy. The following chapter will discuss the possible
consequences of this policy.
C. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OFEARL YPROMOTION
Several research questions can be identified: (1) Do early (below-zone)
promotions help or hurt officers in either the long run or the short run? "Hurt" means
that an officer gains less experience in his current job and, therefore, gets a lower fitrep
score than he would have gotten if promoted in a normal time range. (2) Does a cohort-
switch change one's average FITREP score? Being in a different cohort means an officer
must compete with older and more experienced contemporaries. (3) How long does it
take for an effect to emerge? The damage of a lower FITREP score can be remedied in
junior ranks because opportunities for a second chance are given. In higher ranks, the
damage might occur just before a desired command is achieved; thus, good officers are
rejected even though they might have been successful had they stayed in their original
cohort.
Also, is there a difference in early promotion rates by gender, ethnicity, or
community? In other words, is equal opportunity reflected in early promotion
probabilities, or do quotas still occur in higher and selected positions? Although this is
not the main focus of the thesis, the setup of a model allows us to include demographic
variables.
Additional questions that are examined include: How many officers are affected
by early promotion, and what is the overall significance of early promotion?
Additionally, are more officers harmed by promotion below-zone than are helped? That
is, is the policy desirable in terms of net benefits? If the number of non-selected officers
among the highest groups is statistically equal to the rest of the community, then we do
not find anything wrong. However, non-selected officers among the early promotes
might have done better had they remained in their initial cohort. This interesting question
could be tested by comparing the results of one "in-zone" promoted cohort with the
results of one "below-zone" cohort of a year earlier.
What proportion of officers are hurt and how many are really enhancing their
careers? If only an insignificant number of the "early promotes" are hurt, the policy may
still be considered an effective personnel tool. However, if this personnel policy harms
even some officers, then the Navy might lose outstanding officers who might be well
utilized in a different cohort or in other career paths.
Also, what is the impact of early promotion on joint-Service FITREPs ? How
would joint assignments be influenced by early promotion? The FITREP policy across
services is not standardized in terms of standards and grades (or even formulations). This
can affect a joint FITREP upward or downward, which is undesirable. Not only is this
unfair, but it also does not meet the requirement of having the best person for the best
position at the best point in time.
What are the criteria for below-zone promotions, and are these optimal? The
objectives of below-zone promotion are to provide incentives and to support career
planning and utilization. But are the desired criteria for leaders and flag ranks equal to
those measured in FITREPs ? If this is not the case, or if the FITREP criteria do not
meet future challenges, then the Navy is selecting the wrong people. This thesis does not
analyze the validity of FITREP scores, but both acknowledges that these scores are
sometimes highly questionable and discusses alternate measures of performance.
//. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF EARLY
PROMOTION
The consequences of higher early promotion rates are, of course, intended to be
positive for both the Navy and the individual as discussed in the previous chapter. The
expected positive effects are that high performers are promoted earlier, selected and
screened for command positions and can acquire more experience in a shorter time
period in order to be utilized for senior Navy command positions 4 . However, two
negative spillover effects might occur. First, there is a chance that a change of cohort
might slow one's career, hurting both the individual and the Navy. The person is hurt
because an outstanding officer is actually penalized for superior performance, and the
Navy is hurt by not fully utilizing the individual. Second, the Navy may be worse off if
officers who change cohorts are more likely to leave the Navy, even though they are, in
fact, top performers (selection in the top one percent). In this case, the damage to the
individual is limited since top performers are likely to have a high probability of finding
a good civilian job. But the Navy faces a dilemma if below-zone promotion implies a
career slowdown. This dilemma has personnel management and financial aspects.
A. THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENTASPECTS OFEARLY
PROMOTION
A promotion is generally based on several criteria, including capability,
4 See Table 4 : means for performance outcomes of the observed 0-4 and 0-5' s at selection board
education, experience and demand vacancies. This kind of evaluation in the Navy relies
on fitness reports and the history of performance and fulfilled career path requirements.
Prior to establishing a promotion policy, there must be a set of criteria for performance.
The agreement on criteria for promotions (or in Navy terms, regulations and codes) starts
with the conceptual determination of the Navy's objectives, then is broken down into
ways of measurement and a definition of what constitutes a good and a bad score. The
relevance of a criterion (i.e., if it is sufficient to meet the objectives) has to be determined
as well. Criteria other than performance or career patterns include demand for the
achieved positions, available billets and budget, necessity of the billet, age and other
physical features, and at least clear comparability of the officers being compared. Some
criteria may not be based on technical issues or performance background, but on
subjective issues (whether they are official or just agreed upon unofficially) such as
personal demographics, political correctness, representativeness or appearance and image
and the like.
Although most of the latter are not desirable and are not put in writing, they
might still be influential. Though these subjective issues may apply less to the military
than they do to private firms with less strict observation, laws, regulations and less strict
formal obligations, they may still exist. Who would deny that the assessment of a flag
officer in picking his future aide is influenced by the personal hearing prior to
appointment? Because human nature brings psychological factors into promotion
decisions, it is very important to select the criteria for promotions clearly and to prevent
irrelevant subjective standards. Normal (in-zone) promotions are less affected by this
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discussion than are below-zone promotions because the below-zone promotion is more
visible (Moore, Trout, 1978) and, due to heavy competition, more "sensitive."
Eliminating subjective criteria from the process is even more critical in early promotion
considerations because such promotions are based not only on earlier achievements, but
also on the probability of a successful future career. If an in-zone promotion is
unsuccessful, we often say simply that he 'just didn't make it,' that the worker didn't live
up to the expectations. We observe this situation daily in all work environments. But
when a below-zone promotion fails, it becomes a different matter. No organization can
afford to install a policy on any kind of promotions without the precise determination of
criteria because a failure leads to lack of leadership and, hence, loss of organizational
advantage. Fast-track promotions with the purpose of 'producing' leaders are, hence,
even more devastating in its consequences when they fail. Not only does leadership
advantage fail, but the trust of the remaining employees in their leadership and in their
own chances for advancement also are diminished. So, if the Navy fails in the selection
process for early promotion, the credibility of the entire promotion system is damaged. If
this analysis finds evidence for negative consequences of below-zone promotions, it
needs attention not only because of organizational efficiency, but also because of the
morale and credibility effects.
B. HUMANRESOURCEASPECTS OFEARLYPROMOTION
Without a doubt, promotion involves issues of both motivation and fairness.
Motivation involves awareness of incentives, and fairness involves credibility of the
11
system. Another concern for credibility of the promotion system is equal opportunity for
race and gender, as well as equal treatment for equal performance. A failure of the
promotion system would occur if there is unequal treatment in terms of race, gender or
ethnicity, or if the peer groups do not see the eligibility of the candidate (Muchinsky,
1993, p. 81). If credibility is low, then the incentives might also have low credibility.
This could have either a neutral or negative impact on overall performance, as well as on
the image of the Navy as an employer. But analyzing job satisfaction and credibility on
performance rates as they relate to promotion is unnecessary when the policy of below-
zone promotion is doing well. A lack of criticism of the Navy's promotion system would
imply that the system is working. A positive result of research like in this thesis does
not mean means to abandon future attention or further research on these sociological
issues.
Another issue is the availability of personnel. In times of ample personnel
supply, a less favorable system could work, but in times of greater personnel scarcity, it is
important to have a credible system. Below-zone promotion provides an incentive and
reward for good performance and helps recruiters because they can have confidence in
the system they advertise.
Personnel planning issues came to the fore with the advent of the All-Volunteer
Force in 1973. The "baby boomer" cohorts provided a ready supply of military
manpower. But the recent drawdown and reduced budgets have renewed interest in
personnel planning (Bartholomew, Forbes, and McClean, 1991, p. x). The literature
review of this thesis reveals that there are only a few literature sources available from the
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late sixties, but the early arguments of Mape (1966) and Simanikas (1964) did not occur
in the literature until the early 1990s (Philpot, 1996). So, the below-zone issue as a matter
of personnel planning reflects, in part, the ease of recruiting. Below-zone promotion,
therefore, is more than just a remedy for a personnel management problem; it is a long-
term commitment to meet strategic human resource management objectives.
C PROMOTIONPOLICIESAND OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the military's early promotion policies are numerous. (1) Deep
selection is an incentive for competition and perseverance and encourages officers to
perform better than their contemporaries rather than waiting for their in-zone promotion
point. (2) Deep selection provides an instrument for selecting the best performers and
bringing them into command positions earlier than others, thus saving time and reducing
idle capacity of outstanding skills on the way to command. (3) Although the military is
an internal labor market, it has to compete with the civilian labor market for the best
available personnel not only at the initial entry point, but also at the retention points.
Acquired management and leadership skills make an officer an interesting target for
civilian employers and, therefore, the Navy must offer sufficient career opportunities in
order not to lose their best personnel. (4) Early achievement of command level uses
human resources more effectively and results in a top-level leadership that is still
relatively young in age. This reduces age distance between "crew and Captain" and
utilizes leaders in their peak physical and mental condition. (5) Early promotion brings
officers into command level and allows them to remain for a longer time in their
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subsequent ranks as Captains or flags. This is important for a continous leadership
process. For example, a one-star flag officer in his mid-40s not only can remain in his
position longer, but also can achieve higher ranks in order to better utilize his experience
and skills. (6) Being young in flag rank prevents officers from having to 'hurry' through
flag rank positions. Time to acquire experience in these high positions ensures the
leadership continuum, and the time of flag ranks on the job is less "compressed." (7)
The Navy has to compete with other services in the joint arena. This is another
argument for using early promotion to ensure that joint billets are filled with relatively
young flags. If, for example, the Air Force could fill billets with younger generals for
longer duty, it would clearly have an advantage in the field of manpower and, hence, in
experience and influence over the Navy. (8) The same argument applies for competition
and provision of personnel in the joint international arena. In the last decade, warfare
conditions and participation have been more and more internationalized and joint in
terms of peace-keeping and peace-enforcing missions. The U.S. military, as the
executive force of U.S. foreign policies, is expected by its allies to assume leadership
according to the United States' role as the sole remaining superpower in the world. An
important factor in this leadership is the existence of outstanding and experienced
generals and admirals. The U.S. Navy should have the capacity to assume leadership
and, along with their allies, provide an adequate number of outstanding men and women
(Philpott, 1996)
Some promotion policies and objectives differ in the corporate world. The labor
economic aspects are as follows: (1) Due to fewer regulations and laws, civilian firms
14
can be even more flexible in using fast-track promotions. (2) Profits and revenues
determine the filling of positions and make fast-track promotions not only necessary, but
vital for the growth of a firm. (3) The competitive labor market faces competition such
that it must offer a competitive wage for the best personnel in higher management
positions. Competition could cause top personnel to change jobs. Supply and demand
forces apply more to private firms than to the military and, therefore, top personnel must
be promoted in order to retain the best employees. (4) "Up or Out" is not a matter of
regulation, but a matter of an implicit contract. In this case, the civilian employer faces
the same challenges as the military - this will be discussed later in this thesis (Kahn and
Huberman, 1988). (5) Training problems occur when private employers reorganize the
firm. The Navy can be more or less assured that the education and military skills they
have provided will be utilized. Whereas general training can be utilized by employees
everywhere (making the Navy officer more attractive to the civilian market), specific
training is costly and is not transferable. This difference between civilian-specific and
military-specific training makes the investment (in an enhanced career pattern) for a
civilian employer more risky (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). However, one could argue
that military training is more specific than civilian training and the level of risk taking for
the Navy as an employer is lower than for a civilian firm. Private sector employees face
greater risk because private firm maximize profits, the Navy does not maximize profits so
there is no need to get a return on investment. For the Navy there is hence less risk
attached to education. (6) A firm has a more flexible wage profile and can react to
market conditions more effectively. The investment in human capital is not fixed and
15
can be adjusted in accordance with market conditions. (7) The point of turnover and
promotion (and salary respectively) is easier to determine, and the optimal promotion
ladder is not set by regulation or law.
All these arguments provide the necessary rationale for implementing a fast-track
policy either in the military or in the civilian corporate world. However fast-track
promotions can suffer from setbacks that must be dealt with in order to achieve the
desired goals of efficiency, incentives, profits and maximized utilization of personnel.
These potential setbacks are the focus of research undertaken in this thesis.
D. SELECTIONPROBLEMS
Selecting officers for below-zone promotion can be done with the available data
on the persons under consideration and with data from fitness reports. While we can
predict the performance of officers on several variables, we still have to rely on historical
information. The prediction of the effect of specific variables assumes that other
important factors or variables can be either held constant or controlled in a multivariate
model. The change of circumstances in this research occurs because a promotion below-
zone brings the officer into a different competitive environment. The predictive matters
change, therefore, and the best model cannot predict the probability when other variables
are not controlled. For below-zone promotion, that means that the next available
performance reports of early-promoted officers are compared with reports of officers
who are still in their original cohort (in a less competitive situation). The selection of
officers must predict from existing reports that they will perform at least as good as they
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did in their former cohort (before they got promoted early) .
Only a detailer can observe an individual - his 'client' - in order to check for
possible negative effects of early promotion. This thesis is not the arena for comparing
individuals, as the number of probands exceeds the possible analysis.
Another selection problem is the number of possible candidates for below-zone
promotion. Each community needs a specific number of people to be promoted into
higher ranks. The quota of representatives in higher Navy leadership positions cannot be
drawn from the "best only." The Navy has to look for the best from each community,
meaning that the very best officer selected from, for example, the aviation community
might not be as good as the third best from, say, the intelligence community. But the
Intel officer may not be deep selected because he may be not needed in the future due to
the fact that his community is smaller. Competition in this field has to be seen as a
matter of community as well, causing unfair situations across with other communities.
Unfair means that good performance is not the only argument for below-zone promotion:
community, age, available billets and command desirability drive the efficiency here.
This is the reason that, using individual observations, an early community change of
identified high performers can help save very outstanding men for the future Navy. For
this reason, we will include community variables in our models.
E. ALTERNATIVE PROMOTION POLICIES
This section will discuss alternative promotion practices and their value as a
remedy for potentially negative impacts of below-zone promotion policies. Four
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alternative career flow structures are discussed. These are equivalent to those proposed in
a RAND study (Thie and Brown, 1994).
Up-or-out policy : This highly selective policy has the goal of keeping only the
best and maintaining a "young and vigorous officer corps." The "forcing mechanism"
related to age appears to be highly effective for getting young officers into enhanced
careers, but it encourages high rates of turnover and shorter times on one billet - the
system in force (Thie and Brown, 1994).
Up-and-stav policy : This is an only partially selective policy, designed to maintain
personnel because of their skills, and not necessarily to advance them. Some countries,
such as Germany and Venezuela, use this secondary track to build a corps of careerists
with a tenure-like contract in order to keep senior leadership and skills in the military
(Thie and Brown). The selection process takes place early, with the assumption that the
selectee will maintain his superior skills until he retires. But this is not an effective tool
for early "flag-selection"; the respective countries use selection processes for early
promotion at every point in time without using this policy to select high performers
differently.
In-and out policy : This is also called "the lateral entry structure" and is designed
to remedy personnel shortages and the application of labor market "rules" in the military.
Thie ( 1 994) does not believe that non-military accessions can be used in order to achieve
young leadership quotas. A military leader has to grow through military experience in
order to lead military units in command positions.
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Mixed policy : The mixed policy applies characteristics of up-or-out, up-and-stay
and in-and-out policies. As a general military advancement and career management
policy, it is very useful in terms of skills and personnel scarcities. However, for early
promotion and early selection processes, the "conservative" system of full career officers
appears to be the best way of selecting high performers.
F. LITERATUREREVIEW
Promotion aspects are discussed under several contexts in the management
literature. However, fast-track promotion or below-zone promotion are barely observable
and appear to be of minor importance. In their 1990 book, Managerial Literacy: What
Today 's Managers Must Know to Succeed, Shaw and Webber included a comprehensive
managerial literacy list of expressions and business terms. During their extensive survey,
Shaw and Webber interrogated executive managers from 1 10 American companies and
came up with 1 300 business terms classified into nine functional areas. But promotion,
promotion systems, fast-track promotion or similar terms did not appear. An analysis of
trends and issues in U.S. Navy manpower stated:
[T]he term manpower encompasses the requirements for human
resources, and ways to reconcile requirements and supply to achieve
organizational goals. . . . [A]ll Navy manpower research . . . really comes
down to two questions: ( 1 ) How many people of what kind are needed . . .
and (2) How can those people be obtained . . .? (Lockman, 1987)
Lockman's following reviews and manpower discussion do not mention
promotion or even below-zone aspects as a popular manpower issue.
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Muchinsky (1993) said that promotion is a result of training objectives and
organizational criteria, but his organizational psychology approach did not focus on the
managerial consequences of promotion aspects. Several other books did not discuss this
important manpower issue.
3
Every year, 75,000 students who enter the labor market with
an MBA or economic background will have to decide about promotions and are not
prepared to approach this managerial challenge in any way (Shaw and Webber, 1990,
p.34). Fortunately, the area of Operations Research provides scientific methods and
models for manpower planning. In a 1989 address to the Manpower Society, David Bell
said that "the crucial role of manpower planning is again being recognized by
management" (Bartholomew, Forbes, and McClean, 1991, p. X). So Bartholomew,
Forbes, McClean (1991) offer statistical methods and promotion pattern analyses in
hierarchy models and Markov chain theory models. However, manpower planning does
not entirely cover all aspects of promotion and advancement policies. In 1960, Vice
Admiral(USN) L.S. Sabin commented on this issue:
Not only does he [the early-promoted officer] deserve the reward
of accelerated advancement, but the organization to which he is devoting
his superior abilities is entitled to the benefit of this greater talents in a
position of higher responsibility (Sabin, 1960).
Research about promotion in the Navy was conducted in the sixties: Mape (1964)
analyzed in his sociometric research the validity of fitness reports used for the selection
of below-zone promotes. Using data covering a 25-year period, he found that FITREP
5
Holt: Managerial Principles & Practices, Ehrenberg/Smith: Modern Labor Economics, WEST Series
of Organizational Behaviour, as a few examples, do not provide any tutorial background on this issue
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reports do not provide sufficient information for justifying early promotion. He justified
his arguments by providing general common errors used in appraisals like Halo effects,
effects of central tendency and Leniency Error. He recommended peer ratings and
appraisal training as a remedy. This research developed a model for selection boards to
increase validity of the information from fitness reports:
It is proposed here that peer ratings be adapted to the present selection
system merely as a source of supplementary valid information. The more
valid information available to selection boards, the more valid will be
their selections (Mape, 1964, p. 3).
However, Mape does not discuss consequences of early promotion, but he strongly
supports the concept of the selection of the fittest.
Uelman (1966) discussed the role of promotions in any organization and
especially in the military. Using data from 1957 to 1966, Uelman noted the effect of
below-zone promotion on the morale of officers ranking lieutenant and lieutenant
commander. He observed low rates of below-zone promotion and reasoned why:
The first of these [reasons] has to do with overall morale of the officer
corps. This requires that the promotion system enjoy the confidence of
those whose careers are affected by it. Any actions, such as early
promotions, which tend to favor a few, must be firmly based on merit to
avoid deterioration of this confidence. . . .There has probably been a
hesitancy on part of the selection board to select extensively from below
the zone for fear of shaking this general confidence ... in the system
(Uelman, 1966,pp.65-69).
In contrast to today's viewpoint that modern technology and complexity demands
young and outstanding leaders, Uelman pleads for careful use of below-zone promotion:
[T]he technological complexity of modern weapon systems [places]
increasing demand on line officers of every rank. . . .[T]he author feels a
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one year reduction in time-in-grade, at each rank level, would provide the
minimum time necessary to gain the experience required of the grade and,
at the same time, provide sufficient time-in-grade for reliable evaluation
for promotion to the next higher grade (Uelman, 1966, p. 72).
Uelman calls the exception from minimum time-in-grades "questionable," but he
recommends higher rates of early promotion to demonstrate the opportunities and make
careers more attractive for young men. He predicted higher promotion rates for below-
zone officers and recommended deep selection for the purpose of achieving higher
retention rates.
In an assessment of factors affecting promotion to the field grade level in the U.S.
Marine Corps, Simanikas found that only very few got a promotion:
The Marine Corps belief under the restricted officer concept is that it is
essential that an officer have more than minimum time in grade to gain
breadth of experience (Simanikas, 1966).
His research did not attempt to find distinct differences between promotion zones in
terms of consequences.
Research on promotion probability was conducted by Long (1992), using other
independent variables than the results of performance reports in order to predict
promotion. He used, for example, marital status, race, sex, occupational field, combat
experience and medals to explain promotion. He included all opportunities for
promotion in his dependent variable without specifically distinguishing below-zone
promotion from other types (Long, 1992). Although we neither apply a similar model
nor are led by his results, we will attempt to analyze the effect of variables other than
performance on below-zone promotion. For example, are groups of officers or specific
22
communities significantly related to patterns of below-zone promotion?
Saw (1993) conducted another study on the probability of promotion to LCDR for
submarine and surface warfare officers. He found evidence that the completion of a
master's degree program (especially from NPS) enhances the probability of promotion if
accompanied by high performance and a high Grade Point Average as a pre-
commissioning factor (Saw, 1993). Saw included early (below-zone) selected officers
together with selected in-zone officers in his promotion variable, but did not research if
graduate education enhanced the probability of promotion . We attempt to include
graduate education in the independent variable collection for our model in Chapter III.
Research on fast-track promotion issues in the economics literature is scant.
Carmichael (1983) analyzed workers' observed wage profiles and promotion ladders and
found that senior workers who climbed the promotion ladder of the firm are "earning
more than their marginal product of labor". This outcome would support the fear that
productivity in the long run is slowing down (and would end in less favorable
performance reports). There are promotion and fast-track promotion criteria of
compensation (Bernhardt, 1991), the consequences of early promotion on careers appear
less important in the literature than issues regarding wages or turnover for outstanding
employees.
For instance, firms may be reluctant to place selected workers in
training programs where they develop ... skills. The analysis can then
explain why investment in better populations of workers is systematically
greater. In turn, following the 'fast-track' argument, those workers who
receive this training are more likely to be promoted in the future
(Bernhardt, 1995, pp. 315-339).
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Some interesting assumptions are made:
Employees with more education are promoted more quickly. . . . Fast-
Track promotion: workers who are promoted early are more likely to be
promoted again, before more able, but less quickly promoted, workers
(Baker etal, 1992).
The first assumption will be part of our research, to look for the effect of higher
education on performance and on the probability of below-zone promotion.
Kahn and Huberman (1988) published a model about up-or-out contracts in law-
firms and called this a bilateral "moral hazard problem" and "involuntary layoff"
because people are pushed either to make partner or to leave the firm. Their observation
of up-or-out-contracts did not include fast-track promotion, but mentioned an interesting
viewpoint on the military:
In many organizations, if promotion does not occur within some set in
time, individuals are not retained even when it would appear productive to
do so. . . . [I]n other professions similar cutoff levels . . . appear even
though no special name is attached to them (Kahn and Huberman , 1988).
This raises questions about alternative promotion systems where capable
personnel are not promoted, but are retained in lower positions in order to utilize their
capabilities. For the Navy, we could derive an alternative when below-zone promotion
fails in the long run. In particular, we should give officers who "skipped" a cohort a
second chance when performance reports after below-zone promotions turn out to be
lower. For example, an officer promoted below-zone may get an "above-zone" chance
later. This means that the officer gets back into his original cohort, and the Navy saves a
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good officer who actually performs better in his initial cohort.
The dynamics of military promotion systems are analyzed by Moore and Trout
(1978), who develop a theory of promotion. They work with qualitative matters and
assume that promotion of the best is caused by a network of peers and superiors:
The central argument is that performance, while a necessary standard for
accessibility into a rather large pool of officers from which the elite will
emerge, is nonetheless a minor influence on promotion and becomes even
less discriminating as an officer's career progresses, whereas visibility . . .
becomes the dominant influence (Moore and Trout, 1978, pp.452-468).
A 1994 RAND study analyzed alternative career (promotion) systems and
defined five assumptions for alternative officer career management. Although not aimed
directly at a below-zone promotion system, some proposed systems point in a direction
that helps solve some problems of below-zone promotion.
Thie (1994) proposed:
. . . different principles for regulations of flows into, within, and out of the
officer corps, rules that provide for less turnover and greater stability,
stable career advancement patterns that encourage longer careers, longer
careers as the rule rather than the exception, greater use of lateral entry (p.
138).
For the purpose of this thesis, the RAND career paths provide remedies which are equal
to the desired goals of below-zone promotion: stable patterns, longer careers and greater
stability. RAND also suggested alternatives for adjusting DOPMA. Allowing longer
career lengths solves the problem of "not long enough careers" for flag officers.
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///. DA TA AND METHODOLOGY
A. VARIABLE DEFINITION
1. Dependent Variables
Three separate regression models are estimated with three alternative
performance measures. The dependent variables are regressed on a number of selected
explanatory variables representing background and personal characteristics. The samples
do not include officers who were passed over at one board and promoted at another
because our focus was only on those officers who were reviewed below-zone or in-zone.
An officer's relative position with respect to his group being considered for promotion is
referred to as his "zone". When a particular cohort of officers is presented to a
promotion board, they are said to be "in-zone." Those with less years of service but
considered are called "below-zone", and those who have been passed over early, but who
remain to be considered again but not selected early are above-zone. Promotion board






PROMOTION OUTCOME - 3. PASSED OVER IN-ZONE
4. SELECTED ABOVE-ZONE (LATE)
5 . PASSED OVER ABOVE-ZONE
Figure 1. Promotion Outcomes in Data Set
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For the purpose of this study, candidates in categories (3), (4), and (5) above were
deleted from the data sets. For these models, two dependent variables were used;
XOSCREEN is a binary variable which takes a value of one if the candidate was
screened for command in the Commander data set; COSCREEN is a binary variable that
was one of the conditions. A second dependent variable (PROMOTE) takes a value of
one if the candidate was selected for below-zone promotion to the rank of Commander
(0-5) in the Commander data set or below-zone promotion to Captain (0-6) in the
Captain data set, and a value of zero if the candidate was in-zone for promotion. The last
dependent variable (PERFORM) took a value of one if the candidate was a "good
performer"
6
in both data sets, and a value of zero otherwise. A logit model was used to
estimate the model's coefficients because this method avoids the unboundedness
problem inherent in ordinary least square (OLS) estimates when working with dummy
dependent variables.
2. Independent Variables
The independent (explanatory) variables for this study were selected from the
background and personnel characteristics available in the data base. They were selected
because of their use, in either identical or similar forms, in prior multivariate analyses of
the effects of academic performance and graduate education on the promotion of senior
U.S. Navy officers (Buterbaugh, 1995), graduate degrees and job success (Woo, 1986),
6 The term "good performer" is used in this thesis for officers with PRAP 4 (Commander promotion board)
and PRAP 5 (Captain promotion board) If the respective PRAP is greater than 60 we consider an officer to
be a good performer.
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and academic achievement and job performance (Wise, 1975). The models are run on
pooled (all URL) data sets, as well as on data sets restricted to specific designators.
The first category concerns personal demographics: including MALE, WHITE,
and MWC, all binary variables equal to one if the observed candidate is male, Caucasian,
or married with a least one child, respectively. The same independent variables are used
in all models, with a few exceptions. Because female officers are not represented in the
data for the Submarine Community, the below-zone Surface Warfare Community
(Captain data set), and the below-zone Pilot Community (Commander data set), the
MALE variable was not used in these analyses. Similarly, the WHITE variable was not
used in the below-zone SUB designator in the Captain data set.
Other factors that are likely to have some effect on whether or not an officer is
screened for command, is an exemplary performer, or is selected for promotion are his
or her undergraduate performance, the "quality" of the undergraduate institution
attended, and whether or not the undergraduate degree was in a technical field of study
(Wise, 1975; Talaga, 1994; Buterbaugh, 1995).
These attributes are reflected in binary variables (HIGHAVG, USNA, and
TECH). HIGHAVG takes a value of one if the Academic Profile Code was 2 or 1; TECH
takes a value of one if the undergraduate degree earned is in any engineering field or in
one of the math intensive sciences, such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, operations
research, or microbiology; USNA takes a value of one if the officer was graduated from
the United States Naval Academy.
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Three categorical variables for designator are created and used to control for the
differences in "screened for command," "promotion," and "performance" across
communities. These variables were SWO, SUB, and PLT, and represent the Surface
Warfare, Submarine Warfare, and Aviation (Pilot and Naval Flight Officers together),
respectively. One could argue that combining NFO's with pilots in a binary variable is
not very useful because NFO's never entry the civilian market in their respective field
(like pilots with transferable skills), but here we focus on the result for the entire
community of naval aviation. Definitions of the dependent, categorical, and in-







= 1 if screened for command by the data set
= otherwise
= 1 if promoted to the next rank
= otherwise
= 1 if good performer
= otherwise
DESIGNATORS
swo = 1 if Surface Warfare Officer
= otherwise
SUB = 1 if Submarine Officer
= otherwise
PLT = 1 if Pilot and Naval Flight Officer
= otherwise
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
MALE = 1 if male
= otherwise
WHITE = 1 if Caucasian ethnicity
= otherwise
MWC = 1 if married with at least one child
= otherwise
HIGHAVG = 1 if Academic Profile Code is even 2 or 1
= otherwise
TECH = 1 if engineering or math intensive science
undergraduate degree program
= otherwise
USNA = 1 ifNaval Academy graduate
= otherwise
BELOWZON = 1 if Below-zone promotion Officer
= if In-zone promotion Officer
Table 1. Description ofDependent and Independent Variables
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B. DATA SETS
The data set used in this thesis is based on the Navy Officer Promotion History
Files, which were derived by Drs. William R. Bowman (U.S. Naval Academy) and
Stephen Mehay (Naval Postgraduate School) from U.S. Navy Bureau of Personnel files.
The files contain promotion board results for the years 1986 through 1995. In these files,
the promotion board results are merged with the officer master record as of the time of
the promotion board. Since the data base includes much more information than is
necessary for this analysis, only certain aspects of it were chosen. The first and most
important restriction placed on the data was the requirement that only officers who were
considered for both below- and in-zone timing promotion be included in the data set.
Above-zone promotions were excluded.
Two separate data sets were created (Commander/Captain data sets) by grouping
these in below-zone and in-zone timing promotion. This study will look at the results of
models run on the full data set, at the 0-5 and 0-6 level, on subsets depending on
whether the officers were considered in-zone or below-zone, and on each of three URL
communities.
1. Commander Data Set (0-5)
The Commander data set consists of 13,687 observations and 667 variables. All
of the observations were read, but only 7,952 observations were used in computations.
The number of officers promoted at lower board in the readable part of the data set is
4,599. That represents 67.7 percent of the entire readable data including the missing
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values. Besides, number and percentages are relatively small due to: (1) Only 2129
officers appear to be screened for command, representing 31 percent of the readable data
set, (2) the selected zone promotion where the above-zone promoted officers were
deleted.
This unfortunate reduction in sample size was unavoidable in order to keep the
variables we need for the thesis. Of the candidates in the data set, only 234 were selected
for early promotion to the rank of Commander (0-5). As Table 2 shows, only 2.9 percent
were promoted early. Also, 31.3 percent were screened for command, 67.7 percent got
promoted, and 15.8 percent had high FITREP marks. Table 2 also shows that 99 percent
of the officers were male and 96.6 percent were white. USNA represented 30 percent of
accessions, 57 percent of these candidates had undergraduate degrees in technical fields,
and 74 percent of the sampled population were married with at least one child.
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VARIABLES MEANS














Table 2. The Commander Data Set variables and means
2. Captain Data Set (0-6)
The Captain data set consists of 4,740 observations and 679 variables. Of the
candidates in the data set, only 201 were selected for early promotion to the rank of
Captain (0-6). As Table 3 shows, only 4.2 percent were promoted early. Also, 58.5
percent were screened for command, 53.2 percent got promoted, and 97 percent had high
FITREP marks. Table 2 also shows that most of the candidates were male and white
(99.9 and 98.7 percent, respectively). USNA as commissioning source was represented
with 32 percent, over 36 percent of these candidates had undergraduate degrees in


















Table 3. The Captain Data Set variables and means
3. Comparison Rates
Table 4 shows comparisons of means for both Commander and Captain
data sets, segmented into the below- and in-zone sub samples. The number of
observations for both data sets fell when these restrictions of below- and in-zone
timing promotion were applied to the sample.
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Population N = 234 N = 7,718 N = 201 N = 4,539
XOSCREEN/
COSCREEN .515 .307 .911 .569
PROMOTE .971 .667 .943 .512
PERFORM .145 .159 .993 .970
MALE .996 .990 .995 .999
WHITE .957 .966 .990 .987
SWO .342 .305 .323 .300
SUB .179 .147 .159 .107
PLT .479 .548 .517 .593
fflGHAVG .744 .587 .532 .397
TECH .598 .568 .363 .365
USNA .419 .297 .418 .313
MWC .748 .738 .835 .844
Table 4. Variable means by promotion board (OS and 0-6) and timing
(Below and ln-zone)
Table 4 allows us to compare below-zone promoted officers with in-zone
promoted officers at the promotion board, and we find important information for the
Commander data set: The promotion rate for below-zone officers is 97 percent (in-zone
67 percent); this shows a higher probability of being promoted if below-zone selection
occurs (although we have to look at the number of observations where there are still
more officers promoted in-zone). Below-zone promoted officers in the Commander data
set are 5 1 percent more likely to be screened for command (in-zone 3 1 percent), and this
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is evidence for the higher expectations on below-zone promoted officers. The
PERFORM variable shows only a small difference (14.5 and 15.9 percent respectively)
from the advantage of in-zone selected officers. An explanation could be the tougher
competition in the below-zone sample with more difficult positions and, therefore, more
competitive FITREP situations. The gender and ethnicity variables both show a high
representation of white male officers (> 96 percent). A considerable difference can be
observed in the academic profile, where below-zone selected officers are represented
with 74 percent (in-zone 59 percent) and in the recruiting source, where Naval Academy
graduates are represented by 42 percent for below-zone (30 percent in-zone). The
technical background and marital status are not really different. When splitting the
sample into communities we do not find any apparent important difference between
below- and in-zone.
The Captain data set shows the following means: The promotion rate for below-
zone officers is 94 percent (in-zone 51 percent), this shows a higher probability to be
promoted if below-zone selection occurs like in the Commander data set. Below-zone
promoted officers in the Captain data set are 91 percent more likely to be screened for
command (in-zone 57 percent). This is evidence for the higher expectations on below-
zone promoted officers. The difference from the Commander data set is obvious, with
higher percentages due to relatively more opportunities for command in higher ranks.
The PERFORM variable again shows only a little difference (99 and 97 percent
respectively) from the advantage of below-zone selected officers. The gender and
ethnicity variables both show a high representation of white male officers (> 99 percent)
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and indicate that representation of females and minorities declines with rank. A
difference can be observed in the academic profile, where below-zone selected officers
are represented with 53 percent (in-zone 40 percent), but not as high as for Commanders.
The recruiting source Naval Academy is represented with 42 percent for below-zone (3
1
percent in-zone). The technical background and marital status are not different (+ 1
percent). When splitting the sample into communities, we do not find considerable
differences between below- and in-zone.
C METHODOLOGY
This thesis examines the effects of below-zone promotion on the careers of
officers and attempts to answer several questions: 1) Does below-zone selection put
Navy officers on the fast-track for later promotion? 2) Instead, does below-zone
selection increase the probability that officers will voluntarily leave the Navy ?
The binary nature of the dependent variables, XOSCREEN, COSCREEN,
PROMOTE, and PERFORM, allow for estimation of multivariate models using both
ordinary least-squares (OLS) and maximum likelihood procedures. In the first case, a
linear regression model is specified and estimated, while in the second case, a non-linear
LOG1T model is estimated. It is assumed that all of these dependent variables
(XOSCREEN/COSCREEN, PROMOTE, AND PERFORM) are a function of numerous
background and demographics factors. The dependent variables are regressed on each
members sex, race (white versus non-white), undergraduate major (technical versus non-
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technical), school's academic quality, and marital and dependent status.
Identical models were specified for each subset of the pooled data (including
below- and in-zone timing promotion), as sorted by community designator, as well as for
the overall data set. This allowed for comparisons between officer communities and
between each community and the entire sample population. The parameter estimates
provided by the LOGIT model reflect the increase (or decrease) in the log of the odds
ratio of being screened for command, being promoted, and being an exemplary ("good")
performer, per unit increase in the explanatory variable being considered (Gujarati,
1988). Because each of the explanatory variables in the model is a dummy (binary)
variable, the change in the log of the odds ratio of the outcome variable is seen only
when the observed member possesses the attribute (male, white, etc.) in question. A
more understandable interpretation of these LOGIT coefficients is to convert them to the
change in probability of being screened for command, promoted, or a good performer,
given that the member has the attribute under consideration. There are two ways to
determine this probability. The estimate may be approximated by the formula: B*P(1-P)
where B represents the LOGIT parameter estimate for a given explanatory variable, and P
represents the probability of the observed member having the attribute under
consideration for the overall sample (Gujarati, 1988). As an alternative, since identical
linear probability models were specified, the parameter estimates derived as a result of
the OLS regressions also approximate this result (the change in probability of the
outcome) and are provided in tables with the LOGIT estimates in the following chapter.
The reason for using OLS method is because OLS estimates provide the most convenient
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way of interpreting results, as they represent the calculated change in probability
associated with a one unit change in each of the explanatory variables. With Ordinary
least Squares we can obtain easily the regression coefficients by choosing those beta's




As explained in the previous chapter, the models were estimated for all
designators combined in each major data set (Commander and Captain) as well as for
each separate community. These regressions were run separately in an attempt to
distinguish different behaviors during below-zone promotion as compared with the in-
zone promotion. This chapter will first present some descriptive statistics for the data
sets, and will present the results of the multivariate regressions for the pooled data sets.
The final section will give a comparison of the parameter estimates between below-zone
and in-zone timing promotion.
1. Identification of Officer Performance Measure (OS)
The principal focus of this thesis was to identify the effects of below-zone
promotion on the career of officers and to determine whether below-zone selection puts
Navy officers on the fast-track for later promotion or whether, instead, it causes career
stagnation or separation. Preliminary analysis of this data set reveals that 3 1 percent of
the officers are screened for command, 68 percent are promoted, and 16 percent exhibit
superior performance. Figure 2 shows the complete data set as well as for individual
communities.
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POOLE) SWO SUB PLT
I XO - Screen Promotion H Performance
Figure 2. Mean Values ofAlternative Measures of Officer Performance in URL
Communities (Commander Data Set)
2. Parameter Estimatesfor the Commander Data Set (Pooled)
Both OLS and LOGIT models were estimated for the data set using all three
dependent variables (XOSCREEN, PROMOTE, and PERFORM). This section presents
the overall results for the grouped community designators, as well as for the individual
models run on each community.
The parameter estimates for the LOGIT and OLS model on combined community
designators are provided in Tables 5, 6, and 7, along with the estimated coefficients, and
standard errors. The OLS estimates are the most easily interpreted results, as they closely
represent the calculated change in probability associated with a one unit change in each
of the explanatory variables. For the XOSCREEN model (Table 5), only six of the
eight explanatory variables are statistically significant at a 0.05 level of significance in
terms of their effect on screened for command. Below-zone Officers have higher
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probabilities of being screened for command by 15 percentage points. Likewise, higher
probabilities of being screened for command are observed for those who are graduated
from the U.S. Naval Academy. As indicated by the negative values on their coefficient
estimates, officers whose undergraduate degrees were in math-intensive science or
engineering fields were less likely to be screened for command by 6 percent. Although
white officers represent 96.6 percent of the sample they were less likely to be screened





















Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test): 147.383
Concordance Ratio: 0.527
Note: * Significant at the 0.05 level
Table 5. Parameter Estimates of the Commander Screened for Command Model for
All Designators (Dependent Variable = XOSCREEN)
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The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic for this model, 147.383, tests the joint
significance of all the explanatory variables included in the model. In this case, it is
significant at the .05 level . The concordance ratio, in this case a value of 0.527, provides
a admittedly weak measure of the predictive ability of the model.
For the PROMOTION to 0-5 model (Table 6), six explanatory variables are
statistically significant at a 0.05 level of significance in terms of their effect on
promotion. The probability of being promoted to Captain appears to be positively
influenced by having been selected below-zone at 0-4 level (24 percent), by attendance
at U.S. Naval Academy (13 percent), by having a high academic profile (10 percent), and
by being married with at least one child (7 percent). Undergraduate degrees in math-
intensive science or engineering fields were a detriment for being screened for command
in this data set, and show a 3.2 percent difference in the probability of being promoted to
Captain.
The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic for this model was 334.196 and the
concordance ratio was 0.592. For the PERFORMANCE model (Table 7), only three of
the seven explanatory variables are statistically significant for this data set. The
probability of being an exemplary ("good") performer appears to be positively
influenced by those who are graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy (2 percent difference),
officers whose undergraduate degrees were in math-intensive science or engineering
fields (4 percent), and those whose Academic Profile Code was even 1 or 2 (3 percent).
All other explanatory variables were insignificant at a 95 percent confidence level (0.05
level of significance). The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic for this model was
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Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test): 334. 196
Concordance Ratio: 0.592
Note: * Significant at the 0.05 level
Table 6. Parameter Estimates ofthe Commander Promotion Modelfor All Designators




















Logit Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test): 62.941
Logit Concordance Ratio: 0.544
Note: * Significant at the 0.05 level
Table 7. Parameter Estimates of the Commander Performance Model for All
Designators (Dependent variable = PERFORM)
3. Preliminary Analysis ofthe Captain Data Set (0-6)
Preliminary analysis of this data set reveals that 58 percent of the officers are
screened for command, 53 percent are promoted, and 97 percent exhibit superior
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CO-Screen n Promote to 0-6 rj Performance
Figure 3. Mean Values ofAlternative Measures of Officer Performance in URL
Communities(Captain Data Set)
4. Parameter Estimatesfor the Captain Data Set (Pooled)
The parameter estimates for the LOGIT and OLS model on combined community
designators using all three dependent variables (COSCREEN, PROMOTE, and
PERFORM)
,
are provided in tables 8, 9, and 10, along with the associated signs,
standard errors. BELOWZON appears to keep its significance as an officer progresses
from the Commander promotion board to the Captain promotion board in both the
COSCREEN and the PROMOTION models by 24 and 7 percent, respectively (Tables 8
and 9). But in the PERFORMANCE model BELOWZON is insignificant (Table 10), this
is too due to the fact that there is insufficient variation in the dependent variable
measure. This result is not expected because we assumed that below-zone promoted
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officers are significantly high performers and screened for command. MWC is significant
in both the COSCREEN model (4.4 percent) and the PROMOTION model (0.8 percent).
It is not significant in the PERFORMANCE model. This result is interesting but not
surprising: Consistency and stability of family life is coherent with success and
perseverance on the job. Another assumption could be the "visibility" of female Navy
officers and maybe hidden prejudices against single male officers. A father of at least one
child does not only act more likely as a role model and responsible family head - vice
versa a stable family provides the secure background for professional advantage. The
distribution of this variable and its base case (~ 60/40) enhances this argument. This
outcome is expected (by common sense as well) and supports the general idea of the
model
.
In the COSCREEN model (Table 8), five of the eight explanatory variables are
statistically significant for this data set. The probability of being screened for command
appears to be positively influenced by attendance at U.S. Naval Academy (7 percent).
Good performing officers also show a higher probability of being screened for command
(50 percent). This is a considerably high percentage and desirable in that the best
performers are being screened. The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic for this model
was 176.820 and the concordance ratio was 0.565.
Table 9 shows the parameters estimates of the Captain PROMOTION model.
Only four of the eight explanatory variables are statistically significant for this data set.
The probability of being promoted to Captain appears to be positively influenced by
attendance at U.S. Naval Academy (.8 percent). Good performing officers also showed a
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high probability of being promoted (13 percent). The other explanatory variables
(MALE, WHITE, HIGHAVG, and TECH) were insignificant at a 95 percent confidence
level (0.05 level of significance). The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic for this





















Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test): 176.820
Concordance Ratio: 0.565
Note: * Significant at the 0.05 level
Table 8. Parameter Estimates of the Captain Screened for Command Model for All






















Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test): 192.558
Concordance Ratio: 0.564
Note: * Significant at the 0.05 level
Table 9. Parameter Estimates of the Captain Promotion Model for All Designators
(Dependent variable = PROMOTION)
For the PERFORMANCE model (Table 10), only one of the seven explanatory
variables are statistically significant. The probability of being a good performer appears
to be positively influenced only by those who show a high academic profile (6 percent).
All other explanatory variables were insignificant at a 95 percent confidence level (0.05
level of significance). The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistic for this model was





( Standard Error) Change in Probability
MALE 1.1795













Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test): 16.217
Concordance Ratio: 0.583
Note: * Significant at the 0.05 level
Table 10. Parameter Estimates ofthe Captain Performance Modelfor All Designators
(Dependent variable = PERFORM)
5. Parameter Estimatesfor Specific Communities
Using the XO-Screen in the Commander Data Set we compare the parameter
estimates by communities (Table 11). The only variable that is significant in all of the
communities is USNA. These graduates are more likely to be screened for command than
from other sources (Surface Warfare 4 percent, Submarine 5 percent, and aviation
community is 2 percent). Below-zone promoted officers have a significantly higher
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probability to be screened for command when belonging to the submarine and aviation
community (35 and 25 percent respectively). Technical background is significant only in
the surface warfare community (by a negative 6 percent). This can be explained in reality
by the lower opportunities for engineers to become CO's and to gain the chance to
persevere in the classical warfare arenas. Other assumptions for less chances of
engineers can be derived from theoretical leadership issues, for example: are engineers
more thing-oriented than people-oriented or is the typical way of conducting business in
the engineering field desirable for command positions ? The marital status 'married with
children' has a significant positive influence for the submarine and aviation community
(5 and 1 percent respectively). A high academic profile reduces the probability of being
screened for command in the submarine community (-5 percent). This can be explained
by the challenging education for the submarine community (for example nuclear training)
which does not support an easy gathering of high scores. Fitrep scores are significant in
the submarine community (9 percent higher probability).
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COMMUNITY***
Independent Variables SWO SUB PIT
MALE -0.1188 ** 0.0079
WHITE 0.0249 0.1204 0.0136
MWC 0.0294 0.0482* 0.0105*
HIGHAVG 0.0258 -0.0538* 0.0058
TECH -0.0617* -0.0259 -0.0064
USNA 0.0441* 0.0538* 0.0199*
PERFORM 0.0315 0.0936* -0.0037
BELOWZON 0.0716 0.3525* 0.2531*
sample size 2431 1177 4344
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Screened for Command (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in appendices
Table 11. Parameter Estimates (OLS)for the XO-Screen Model by Community
(Dependent variable = XOSCREEN)
Using the promotion model in the Commander data set we compare the parameter
estimates by communities (Table 12). Overall significance for all communities are
discovered for BELOWZON, USNA, and TECH variables. The BELOWZON variable is
significant. The interpretation that the likelihood of being promoted increases when
screened for below-zone promotion is redundant. USNA are more likely to be promoted
by 12, 19, and 13 percentage points, respectively. TECH is significant with a positive
result for the submarine community (17 percent) and negative for the surface warfare and
aviation community (4 and 6 percent, respectively). This result for technical background
candidates is of interest: while SWO and aviation community show negative significance
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the submarine community reflects positive impact of a technical background. Again
when comparing this model with Table 1 1 we assume less importance of engineering
skills for the operational billets in the SWO and aviation community and a higher
importance of technical background in the submarine community (emphasis on nuclear
education). So we assume this model reflects the real world and provides a satisfactory
control device within this research. Being married with children (8 and 6 percent,
respectively) as well as a high Academic Profile Code (7 and 10 percent, respectively)
are significant for the surface warfare and aviation community.
COMMUNITY***
Independent Variables SWO SUB PLT
MALE -0.1521 ** -.0.0542
WHITE 0.0061 -0.2286 0.09
MWC 0.0783* 0.0690 0.0632*
HIGHAVG 0.0657* 0.1134 0.1032*
TECH -0.0424* 0.1700* -0.0579*
USNA 0.1157* 0.1898* 0.1349*
PERFORM 0.0316 0.0778 0.0965*
BELOWZON 0.1953* 0.2081* 0.2964*
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Promotion (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in appendices
Table 12. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander Promotion Model by
Community (Dependent variable = PROMOTE)
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Using the performance model in the Commander data set we compare the
parameter estimates by communities (Table 13). A technical background increases the
probability of better fitrep scores for the aviation community (3 percent). The same
variable decreases the probability of better fitrep scores for the submarine community (7
percent). Why does a technical background reduce the probability of being screened for
XO in the submarine community, when we generally assume that this community is very
technically related ? Maybe the importance of the engineering field does not necessarily
lead to higher fitrep scores and after all: the job of an XO is less related to the technical
field but more to the warfare and leadership type of business of a ship. The contradiction
in the sign for the submarine community (when comparing with Table 12) can be
explained by the assumed more difficult and competitive way of awarding fitrep scores in
the submarine community where technical skills and knowledge have to be on an
especially higher standard, but when it comes to leadership (XO and CO) the technical
skills are still important but play a secondary role. The below-zone variable does not
provide any valuable information on fitrep scores for this respective group.
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COMMUNITY***
Independent Variables SWO SUB PLT
MALE -0.0353 ** -0.0231
WHITE -0.0091 0.1034 0.047
MWC 0.0325 0.0026 -0.0004
HIGHAVG -0.0243 0.0181 0.0117
TECH 0.02491 -0.0712* 0.0261*
USNA -0.0066 0.0331 0.0087
BELOWZON 0.0114 -0.0262 0.0358
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because ofno variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Performance (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in appendices
Table 13. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander Performance Model by
Community (Dependent variable = PERFORM)
Using the CO-Screen in the Captain data set, we compare the parameter estimates
by communities (Table 14) before below-zone selection. Few significant results are
discovered for the submarine community. WHITE is significant for the aviation
community; however, the representation of about 99 percent does not give us reason to
analyze this variable any further. The below-zone promoted officers are more likely to
be screened for command than in-zone promoted officers: 30 percent (Surface warfare
community) and 19 percent ( aviation community), respectively. This is a desired
outcome and shows that the policy of below-zone promotion and its purpose, getting
good officers into command positions early, is working (although there is not
significance at the 95 percent confidence level for the submarine community). MWC
works as a control variable again, the overall significance of the increasing probability
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for two communities when 'married with children' points at the stability of family
background again. A technical background reduces the likelihood of being screened for
command for the aviation community (2 percent). USNA graduates show a significantly
higher probability of being screened for command surface warfare community (8
percent).
COMMUNITY***
Independent Variables SWO SUB PLT
MALE -0.2548 ** -0.0452
WHITE 0.0057 -0.0031 0.1628*
MWC 0.0939* -0.0224 0.0289*
HIGHAVG -0.0511 -0.0163 -0.0137
TECH 0.0374 -0.0074 -0.01877*
USNA 0.0840* 0.0904 -0.0037
PERFORM 0.5878* 0.8993 0.3017*
BELOWZON 0.3011* 0.0227 0.1879*
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because ofno variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Screened for Command (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in appendices
Table 14. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Captain Screenedfor Command Model
by Community (Dependent variable = COSCREEN)
Using the Promotion Model in the Captain Data Set we compare the parameter
estimates by communities (Table 15). This model again shows a decrease in promotion
probability for minority officers in the aviation community (11 percent). BELOWZON
shows high significance for all communities. But the surface warfare community shows
only 3 percent when compared to the submarine and aviation communities (23 and 20
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percent, respectively). Other variables showing considerable significance to increase the
probability of being promoted are: Married with children for the surface warfare
community (0.7 percent) and for the aviation community (2 percent). A high academic
profile code appears in the SUB community (16 percent). A higher fitrep score is
significant for the surface warfare (14 percent) and the aviation community (23 percent).
This is (again) not surprising and is how we expect promotions to be based on
performance variables like APC scores and fitreps. TECH has (again) a negative affect
for the submarine community (15 percent). USNA shows no significant result in this
model.
COMMUNITY***
Independent Variables SWO SUB PLT
MALE 0.0791 ** -0.01736
WHITE -0.0027 -0.4586 0.1148*
MWC 0.0065* 0.0683 0.0206*
HIGHAVG -0.0026 0.15931* -0.011
TECH -0.0006 -0.1471* -0.0074
USNA 0.0043 0.1164 0.00629
PERFORM 0.1359* 0.2584 0.2327*
BELOWZON 0.0320* 0.2325* 0.2023*
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Promotion (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in appendices
Table 15. Parameter Estimates (OLS)for the Captain Promotion Model by Community
(Dependent variable = PROMOTE)
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Using the Performance Model in the Captain Data Set we compare the parameter
estimates by communities (Table 16). The only significant variable in any of the models
is HIGHAVG. The likelihood of showing higher performance is 15 percent for below-
zone selectees in the aviation community, but the coefficient is insignificant.
COMMUNITY***
Independent Variables SWO SUB PLT
MALE -0.2358 ** -0.0003
WHITE 0.1312 -0.0019 0.2139
MWC 0.0291 0.0010 0.0918
HIGHAVG -0.0595 0.0022 0.1479*
TECH 0.0418 -0.0049 0.0103
USNA -0.0641 -0.0013 0.0502
BELOWZON -0.0583 0.0007 0.1526
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Performance (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in appendices
Table 16. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Captain Performance Model by
Community (Dependent variable = PERFORM)
6. Differences in the Effect ofDeterminants in the Below-Zone and In-
Zone Sub-Samples
This section will attempt to compare the effects of determinants in the below-
zone and in-zone sub-samples, by all designators, and separately for each individual
communities. The reason for computing separate models by zone is to determine whether
the effect of explanatory variables is the same for individuals reviewed below and in-
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zone. Table 17 shows the parameter estimates for the OLS linear probability model for
the screened for command model for combined community designators. The variables in
the below-zone model are mostly insignificant due to the sample size. For the captain
data set, only PERFORM is significant in the below-zone sub-sample. Higher fitrep
scores in the captain data set increase the probability of being screened for command for
the below-zone officers by 99 percent and for in-zone officers by 50 percent. These
effects, however, seem suspect.
COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAINDATA SET
Independent Variables BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE -0.3528 -0.2950* -0.0037 -0.2039
WHITE 0.13133 -0.1226* 0.0039 0.19606*
MWC -0.1533 0.0060 -0.0019 0.0582*
fflGHAVG -0.0119 0.0010 -0.0033 0.0123*
TECH 0.0099 -0.06357* -0.0028 0.0228
USNA 0.0246 0.06829* 0.0064 0.0826*
PERFORM 0.0647 0.0742* 0.9922* 0.5029*
sample size 234 7,718 201 4,539
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in represent*
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Screened fo
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
ttion
r Command (from OLS estimates)
Table I 7. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Screened for
Command Model for Below-zone and In-zone Sub-samples. (Dependent variable =
COSCREEN/XOSCREEN)
Table 18 shows the parameter estimates for the OLS linear probability model for
the promotion model for combined communities designators estimated by sub-sample.
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None of the below-zone variables are significant in both models except PERFORM in the
captain data set. Again these results are suspect due to the poor explanatory power of the
model for the below-zone sample.
COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAIN DATA SET
Independent Variables BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE -0.0059 -0.1057 0.0572
WHITE -0.0014 0.0243 0.0076
MWC 0.0005 0.0687* 0.0045*
HIGHAVG -0.0023 0.0989* 0.0004
TECH -0.0010 -0.0322* -0.0011
USNA 0.0002 0.1366* 0.0037*
PERFORM 0.0005 0.0701* 0.9949* 0.0618*
sample size 234 7,718 201 4,539
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in represents
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Promotion
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
ition
(from OLS estimates'
Table 18. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Promotion Model
for Below-zone and In-zone Sub-samples. (Dependent variable = PROMOTE)
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COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAIN DATA SET
Independent Variables BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE 0.19469 -0.03536 -0.07802 0.08928
WHITE -0.01868 0.01888 -0.06568 0.01871
MWC -0.01214 0.01377* 0.00701* 0.19516*
HIGHAVG 0.02984 0.02409* -0.00233 0.02727*
TECH -0.0065 0.03682* -0.01215* 0.01911
USNA -0.02254 0.02049* 0.00302 0.0244
sample size 234 7,718 201 4,539
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Performance (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 19. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Performance
Modelfor Below-zone and In-zone Sub-samples. (Dependent variable - PERFORM)
Table 19 shows the parameter estimates for the OLS linear probability model for
the performance model for combined community designators. None of the variables are
statistically significant in both models. An analysis of the below-zone and in-zone
promotion for the screened for command model, the surface warfare officer (SWO)
community is shown in Table 20. The only comparison is possible for the captain data set
for the PERFORM variable. Below-zone selected O-6's are 88 percent more likely for
being screened for command than in-zone selected officers (56 percent), but small
sample sizes again make these results problematic.
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COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAIN DA TA SET
Independent Variables BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE -0.1112 -0.11702 ** -0.2698
WHITE 0.0206 0.0197 ** 0.0078
MWC 0.0012 0.0293 0.1005*
HIGHAVG -0.0622 0.0285 -0.0531
TECH -0.087 -0.064* 0.0344
USNA -0.0448 0.0486* 0.0001 0.0807*
PERFORM 0.0321 0.0280 0.8829* 0.5637*
sample size 80 2351 65 1360
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Screened for Command (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 20. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Screened for
Command Model Surface Warfare Officersfor Below-zone and In-zone sub-samples
(Dependent variable = COSCREEN/XOSCREEN)
Based on the results of this analysis, screened for command rates for officers in
the Submarine Warfare Community, as show in Table 21, seem to be unaffected by the
explanatory variable and no variables are significant across both sub-samples for the
Commander and Captain data set.
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COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAINDATA SET
Independent Variables BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE ** ** ** **
WHITE 0.3362 0.1221 ** 0.0021
MWC 0.0279 0.0501* ** -0.0316
KGHAVG -0.1440 -0.0535 ** -0.0260
TECH -0.0686 -0.0284 ** -0.0100
USNA 0.0976 0.0560* ** 0.1171
PERFORM 0.2732 0.0915* ** 0.8649
sample size 42 1135 32 487
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because ofno variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Screened for Command (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 21. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Screened for
Command Model Submarine Warfare Officers for Below-zone and In-zone sub-
samples (Dependent variable = COSCREEN/XOSCREEN)
The parameter estimate comparisons for the screened for command model,
Aviation Warfare community (PLT) are provided in Table 22. For the Commander data
set, MWC shows significance for both sub-samples. Being married with at least one child
reduces screened for command probabilities by 14 percent for below-zone selectees but
increases its probability by only 2 percent foi in-zone selectees. The conclusion that
enhanced careers jeopardize family life is tempting, but due to small sample size this is
purely speculative.
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COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAIN DA TA SET
Independent Variables BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE ** 0.0068 -0.0074 **
WHITE 0.2944 0.0086 -0.0075 0.0515*
MWC -0.1437* 0.0164* -0.0014 0.0048*
HIGHAVG 0.0626 0.0061 -0.0106* -0.0017
TECH 0.0115 -0.0073 -0.0065 -0.0025*
USNA -0.0591 0.0252* -0.0004 -0.0005
PERFORM -0.00408 -0.0038 ** 0.1277*
sample size 112 4232 104 2692
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Screened for Command (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 22. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Screened for
Command Model Aviation Warfare Officersfor Below-zone and In-zone sub-samples
(Dependent variable = COSCREEN/XOSCREEN)
An analysis of the below-zone and in-zone samples for the promotion model for
the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community is shown in Table 23. The only
significant variable in the captain data set is PERFORM. In the below-zone sample high
performing officers have a 92 percent higher probability of being promoted over 13
percent of the in-zone selected officers. Again, however, this results should be viewed
cautiously.
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COMMANDER DA TA SET CAPTAINDATA SET
Independent Variables BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE -0.0036 -0.1534 ** 0.0831
WHITE -0.0015 -0.0045 ** -0.0029
MWC 0.0018* 0.0814* -0.0014 0.0080*
HIGHAVG -0.0058 0.0694* -0.0025 -0.0026
TECH -0.0005 -0.0416* 0.0026 0.0008
USNA 0.0005 0.1179* 0.0132 0.0044*
PERFORM 0.0009 0.0310 0.9236* 0.1351*
sample size 80 2351 65 1360
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Promotion (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 23. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Promotion Model
Surface Warfare OfficersforBelow-zoneandTn-zonesub-samples (Dependentvanable=PROMOTE)
COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAINDATA SET
Independent
Variables
BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE ** ** ** **
WHITE -0.0558 -0.2593 ** -0.4576
MWC 0.0057 0.0610 ** 0.0712
HIGHAVG 0.0050 0.1087 ** 0.1622*
TECH -0.0365 0.1621* ** -0.01507*
USNA -0.0209 0.1837* ** 0.1091
PERFORM 0.0035 0.0752 ** 0.2476
sample size 42 1135 32 487
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Promotion (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 24. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Promotion Model
Submarine H(irfare(^^mf(>rHdtM^^^andhh^Hk'sulhS(m^es(DepeTkletit variable =PROMOTE)
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COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAIN DA TA SET
Independent
Variables
BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE ** -0.0524 0.0009 **
WHITE -0.0131 0.0916 -0.0120 0.0893*
MWC 0.0512 0.0613* -0.0112 0.0150*
HIGHAVG -0.0443 0.1048* 0.0018 -0.0007
TECH -0.1365 -0.0583* 0.010 -0.0054
USNA 0.0378 0.1368* -0.0021 0.0047
PERFORM 0.0221 0.0977* ** 0.1672*
sample size 112 4232 104 2692
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Promotion (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 25. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Promotion Model
Aviation Warfare Officers for Below-zone and In-zone sub-samples (Dependent
variable = PROMOTE)
Using the promotion and performance model for the comparison of in-zone and
below-zone samples in all analyzed communities ranking at the 0-5 and 0-6 point there
are no significant variables (Tables 24-28).
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COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAINDATA SET
Independent
Variables
BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE 0.0331 -0.0450 ** -0.2462
WHITE 0.0047 -0.0122 ** 0.1299
MWC -0.0015 0.0399 -0.0700 0.0353
HIGHAVG 0.0136* -0.0324 0.0471 0.0535
TECH -0.0001 0.0278 0.0580 0.00356
USNA -0.0007 -0.0069 0.0623 -0.00564
sample size 80 2351 65 1360
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Performance (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 26. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Performance
Model Surface Warfare Officers for Below-zone and In-zone sub-samples (Dependent
variable = PERFORM)
COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAINDATA SET
Independent
Variables
BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE ** ** ** **
WHITE -0.0637* 0.1815 ** -0.0018
MWC 0.0004 0.034 ** 0.0010
HIGHAVG -0.0598* 0.0155 ** -0.0020
TECH 0.0004 -0.0509* ** -0.0049
USNA -0.0005 0.0266 ** -0.0012
sample size 42 1135 32 487
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because ofno variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Performance (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 27. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Performance
Model Submarine Warfare Officers for Below-zone and In-zone sub-samples
(Dependent variable = PERFORM)
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COMMANDER DATA SET CAPTAIN DATA SET
Independent
Variables
BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE BELOW-ZONE IN-ZONE
MALE ** -0.0239 ** **
WHITE 0.1203 0.0440 ** 0.2268
MWC 0.0147 -0.0001 ** 0.0952
HIGHAVG -0.0022 0.0130 ** 0.1533*
TECH -0.0171 0.0287* ** 0.0106
USNA -0.03051 0.0287 ** 0.0539
sample size 112 4232 ** 2692
Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level
** Not included in model because of no variance in representation
*** Coefficients represent change in probability of Performance (from OLS estimates)
**** LOGIT model results may be found in Appendices
Table 28. Parameter Estimates (OLS) for the Commander/Captain Performance
Model Aviation Warfare Officers for Below-zone and In-zone sub-samples
(Dependent variable = PERFORM)
The results in this section are disappointing, but appear to be attributable to the
small sample size in the below-zone sub-sample. Thus, the coefficients could not be





Officers at the 0-5 promotion board level who are selected below-zone have a 1
5
percent higher probability of being XO-screened and a 24 percent higher probability of
being promoted than those selected in-zone. The general conclusion for the Commander
data set regarding below-zone promotion is that the probability of being screened for
command and being promoted is higher, for all other factors there is no evidence for a
considerable difference between the timing promotions (Table 29).
Officers at the 0-6 promotion board level who are selected below-zone have a
24 percent higher probability of being CO-screened and a 7.2 percent higher probability
of being promoted than those selected in-zone. For all other factors there is no evidence





XO/CO SCREEN 15% 24%
PROMOTE 24% 7.2 %
PERFORMANCE not significant not significant
Table 29. Impact ofBelow-Zone at lower Grade on Subsequent Officer Performance
The models XO/SCREEN, PROMOTION and PERFORMANCE with only
below-zone selected officers reveal no significant explanatory variables for the 0-5
promotion board. At the 0-6 promotion board performance is the only significant
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variable for the COSCREEN and the PROMOTION models. Good performers are by 99
percent more likely to be selected below-zone. This should not be surprising and is an
expected outcome to support the hypothesis that below-zone selection is a valid
personnel policy. The PERFORMANCE model reveals results only for the 0-6
promotion board, where a technical background and the marital status appear to have a





XO/CO SCREEN No significant results PERFORM, 99 %
PROMOTE No significant results PERFORM, 99 %
PERFORMANCE No significant results MWC, 0.7%
TECH, - 1 %
Table 30. Significant Variablesfor the Below-Zone Models
The analysis of the purpose of below-zone promotion in the qualitative
discussion reveals a lot of convincing arguments in support of the policy to be
maintained. Selecting high-performing personnel for fast-track careers is a valuable
policy for an organization. The quantitative analysis supports the view that officers on
the fast-track are in general able to advance their careers at rates superior to that of their
peers. The observations show that below-zone promoted officers have higher
probabilities for being screened and promoted. Obviously is performance the most
significant rewarding factor for below-zone promotion. The assumption that they are
more likely to show lower later performance or are not as likely to be screened for
72
command because of their different career path could not be supported.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis analyzed the policy by comparing means of specific variables which
appeared to be most important for an officer's career. Two other methodologies with a
much higher effort could be considered: ( 1 ) Tracking of individuals and checking for
setbacks associated with below-zone promotion - a method which needs to be applied
carefully in terms of privacy. (2) A direct comparison of in-zone and below-zone cohorts
which share the same career conditions with the method of including in-zone and above-
zone officers from an older cohort would give a more complete test of the theory. (3) The
construction of a retention model using below-zone, in-zone, and above-zone variables at
the lower board could offer information about retention behavior and how the impact of
this policy is for the Navy. However, all of these methods will suffer the same problem
encountered here of small sample sizes, especially when comparing individual
communities. The method used here provides a first analysis of the data for this problem
and does not reveal evidence that the policy is hurting the Navy in any way. We do not
think that the policy needs to be investigated more closely, but we are convinced that
further research and frequent checking of the data should be considered. Even though the
sample size turns out to be the main reason for non-significant results of this trial, we
leave this section as an initial starting point for further research.
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APPENDIX A. COMMANDER LOGITMODEL RESULTS
(ALL DESIGNA TORS)
TABLE A. 1 LOGIT RESULTS FOR COMMANDER SCREENED FOR COMMAND MODEL
(ALL DESIGNATORS)
Data Set: WORK ONE
Response Variable: XOSCREEN
Response Levels: 2







WARNING: 6991 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 8351.624 8220.241
SC 8358433 8281.524
-2LOGL 8349.624 8202.241 147.383 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
Score 152.869 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 8744 0.3023 8.3678 0.0038 2.398
MALE 1 -1.2338 0.2695 20.9625 0.0001 -0.067204 0.291
WHITE 1 -0.4835 0.1417 11.6401 0.0006 -0.049556 0.617
BELOWZON 1 0.9100 0.1533 35.2272 0.0001 0.086232 2.484
MWC 1 0.00808 0.0602 0.0180 0.8933 0.001962 1.008
HIGHAVG 1 000395 0.0538 0.0054 0.9414 0.001074 1.004
TECH 1 -0.2852 0.0537 28.2462 0.0001 -0.078165 0.752
USNA 1 0.3564 0.0575 38.4806 0.0001 0.091074 1.428










Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 52.7% Somers 1 D = 0.163
Discordant = 36.4% Gamma = 0.183
Tied =11.0% Tau-a = 0.070
(9683879 pairs) c = 0.581
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TABLE A. 2 LOGIT RESULTS FOR COMMANDER PROMOTIONMODEL
(ALL DESIGNATORS)
Data Set: WORK ONE
Response Variable: PROMOTE
Response Levels: 2







WARNING: 6990 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.







-2 LOG L 8339.506 8005.310
Score
Variable
334. 196 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
313.913 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Vanable
DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 0.4355 0.3026 2.0716 0.1501 1.546
MALE 1 -0.4333 0.2697 2.5802 0.1082 -0.023598 0.648
WHITE ] 0.1083 0.1418 0.5830 0.4451 0.011100 1.114
BELOWZON 1 1.2560 0.1535 66.9838 0.0001 0.119011 3.511
MWC 1 0.3013 0.0603 24.9945 0.0001 0.073172 1.352
HIGHAVG 1 0.4301 0.0538 63.8388 0.0001 0.116868 1.537
TECH 1 -0.1338 0.0537 6.2119 0.0127 -0.036687 0.875
USNA 0.6173 0.0575 115.2650 0.0001 0.157753 1.854










Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 59.2% Somers' D = 0.258
Discordant = 33.4% Gamma = 0.279
Tied = 7.5% Tau-a = 0.111
(9668646 pairs) c = 0.629
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WARNING: 6990 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 5008.914 4959.974
SC 5015.724 5014.449
-2LOGL 5006.914 4943.974 62.941 with 7 DF (p=0.0001)
Score 62.953 with 7 DF (p=0.000 1
)
Analvsis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
InterceptINTERCPT 1 -2.4170 0.4269 32.0503 0.0001 0.089
MALE 1 -0.2077 0.3807 0.2977 0.5853 -0.011313 0.812
WHITE ] 0.1620 0.2002 0.6546 0.4185 0.016598 1.176
BELOWZON 1 0.1527 0.2166 0.4973 0.4807 0.014471 1.165
MWC 1 0.0538 0.0851 0.4004 0.5269 0.013069 1.055
HIGHAVG 1 0.2728 0.0759 12.9185 0.0003 0.074122 1.314
TECH 1 0.4165 0.0756 30.3445 0.0001 0.114171 1.517







Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 54.4% Somers' D = 0.171
Discordant = 37.3% Gamma = 0.187
Tied = 8.3% Tau-a = 0.037




APPENDIX B. CAPTAIN LOGITMODEL RESULTS
(ALL DESIGNATORS)












WARNING: 2026 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables









176.820 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
166.561 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 -1.4749 1.2772 1.3335 0.2482 0.229
MALE 1 -1.5744 1.1975 1.7286 0.1886 -0.028849 0.207
WHITE ] 0.8466 0.3736 5.1363 0.0234 0.049611 2.332
BELOWZON 1 1.1829 0.1797 43.3083 0.0001 0.144276 3.264
MWC 1 0.2687 0.1123 5.7283 0.0167 0.052518 1.308
HIGHAVG 0.0398 0.0822 0.2352 0.6277 0.010857 1.041
TECH 1 0.1035 0.0830 1.5547 0.2124 0.027531 1.109
USNA 0.3994 0.0848 22.1827 0.0001 0.104747 1.491










Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 56.5% Somers' D = 0.228
Discordant = 33.7% Gamma = 0.252
Tied = 9.8% Tau-a = 0.107
(1729893 pairs) c = 0.614
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WARNING: 2020 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates
AIC 3693.867 3517.308
SC 3699.775 3570.484
-2LOGL 3691.867 3499 308 192.558 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Score 175.967 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 -3.7682 1.2562 8.9989 0.0027 0.023
MALE 1 1.1337 1.1777 0.9266 0.3357 0.020750 3.107
WHITE 1 0.5288 0.3674 2.0718 0.1500 0.030955 1.697
BELOWZON 1 1.5168 0.1762 74.1321 0.0001 0.185430 4.558
MWC 1 0.3386 0.1103 9.4272 0.0021 0.066194 1.403
HIGHAVG 1 0.0237 0.0807 0.0861 0.7692 0.006453 1.024
TECH 1 -0.1021 0.0816 1.5674 0.2106 -0.027157 0.903
USNA 1 0.2976 0.0833 12.7658 0.0004 0.078048 1.347










Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 56.4% Somers' D = 0.226
Discordant = 33.8% Gamma = 0.251
Tied = 9.8% Tau-a = 0.110
(1796239 pairs) c = 0.613
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TABLE B.3 LOGITRESULTS FOR CAPTAINPERFORMANCE MODEL
(ALL DESIGNATORS)
Data Set: WORK ONE
Response Variable: PERFORM
Response Levels: 2







WARNING: 2020 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.















16.217 with 7 DF(p=0.0232)
18.850 with 7 DF (p=0.0087)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized





























0.0891 0.7653 -0.021589 0.307 1=MALE; 0=FEMALE
2.7219 0.0990 0.118971 7.634 1=WHITE; 0=OTHER
1.0113 0.3146 0.072644 1.812 1=BELOW-ZONE:0=IN-ZONE
1.5542 0.2125 0.090142 1.586 1=MARRIED/CHILD:0=OTHERWISE
8.8034 0.0030 0.218509 2.230 1=H. AVERAGE;0=L. AVERAGE
0.1184 0.7307 0.025043 1.099 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
2.2472 0.1339 109810 1.520 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 58.3% Somers' D = 0.301
Discordant = 28.2% Gamma = 0.348
Tied = 13.5% Tau-a = 0.013
(159600 pairs) c = 0.650
81
82
APPENDIX C. COMMANDER LOGITMODEL RESULTS
(BYDESIGNATORS)












WARNING: 324 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 2396.080 2379.751
SC 2401.733 2430.628
-2LOGL 2394.080 2361.751 32.329 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Score 31.712 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analvsis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr > Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 1.3341 0.4122 10.4755 0.0012 3.797 Intercept
MALE 1 -0.6134 0.3624 2 8656 0.0905 -0.047830 0.541 1=MALE; 0=FEMALE
WHITE 1 0.1578 0.2093 0.5687 0.4508 0.020864 1.171 1=WHITE;0=OTHER
BELOWZON 1 0.5073 0.2839 3.1946 0.0739 0.049443 1.661 1=BELOW-ZONE;0=IN-ZONE
MWC I 0.1885 0.1115 2.8580 0.0909 0.047458 1.207 1 =MARRIED/CHILD:0=OTHERWISE
HIGHAVG 1 0.1639 0.1011 2.6294 0.1049 0.045105 1.178 1=H. AVERAGE;0=L. AVERAGE
TECH 1 -0.3403 0.1003 11.4977 0.0007 -0.093791 0.712 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
USNA 1 0.2922 0.1085 7.2495 0.0071 0.074982 1.339 1=USNA SOURCE. 0OTHERWISE
PERFORM 1 0.2028 0.1492 1.8472 1741 0.037506 1.225 l=GOOD PERFORM:0=OTHERW1SE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 55.5% Somers' D = 0.166
Discordant = 38.9% Gamma = 0.176
Tied = 5.6% Tau-a = 0.063
(844122 pairs) c = 0.583
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WARNING: 258 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 1077.730 1047.187
SC 1082.554 1085.773
-2LOGL 1075.730 1031.187 44.543 with 7 DF (p=0.0001)
Score 46.889 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)










Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable























































Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 58.3% Somers' D = 0.265
Discordant =31.8% Gamma = 0.294
Tied = 9.9% Tau-a = 0.105
(167250 pairs) c = 0.632
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WARNING: 674 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables







2 LOG L 2048.120 2018.925
Score
29. 196 with 8 DF (p=0.0003)
72.810 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized


























































1.462 1 =WHITE; 0=OTHER
12.499 1=BELOW-ZONE;0=IN-ZONE
1.355 1=MARRIED/CHILD;0=OTHERWISE
1. 195 1=H. AVERAGE;0=L. AVERAGE
0.788 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
1 .680 1=USNA SOURCE; 0=OTHERW1SE
0.876 l=GOOD PERFORM;0=OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 58.3% Somers' D = 0.241
Discordant = 34.2% Gamma = 0.261
Tied = 7.5% Tau-a = 0.036
(992544 pairs) c = 0.621
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WARNING: 324 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.




Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covariates
AIC 2658.134 2578.219
SC 2663.787 2629.097
-2LOGL 2656.134 2560.219 95.915 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
Score 90.508 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
rNTERCPT 1 0.7359 0.3839 3.6750 0.0552 2.087
MALE 1 -0.6400 0.3375 3.5965 0.0579 -0.049900 0.527
WHITE 1 0.0281 0.1949 0.0207 0.8855 0.003710 1.028
BELOWZON 1 1.1775 0.2643 19.8424 0.0001 0.114755 3.246
MWC 1 0.3861 0.1038 13.8236 0.0002 0.097199 1.471
HIGHAVG 1 0.3195 0.0941 11.5180 0.0007 0.087915 1.376
TECH 1 -0.1876 0.0934 4.0320 0.0446 -0.051723 0.829
USNA 1 0.5997 0.1011 35.2137 0.0001 0.153897 1.822














Discordant =34.7% Gamma =0.268
Tied = 5.2% Tau-a =0.111
(973332 pairs) c = 0.627
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WARNING: 258 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.







-2 LOG L 985.428 921.617
Score
63.811 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
62.411 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
















































Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 63.0% Somers' D = 0.356
Discordant = 27.3% Gamma = 0.395
Tied = 9.7% Tau-a = 0.125
(148390 pairs) c = 0.678
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WARNING: 673 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.

















-2 LOG L 4658.360 4485.561
Score
172.799 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
161.156with8DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter
DF Estimate
Standard Wald Pr> Standardized

































































Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 58.2% Somers' D = 0.239
Discordant = 34.3% Gamma = 0.258
Tied = 7.5% Tau-a = 0.106
(2981554 pairs) c = 0.619
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WARNING: 324 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.















6.856 with 7 DF(p=0.4441)
6.816 with 7 DF (p=0.4483)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
TECH 1 0.1774 0.1304







1.8493 0.1739 0.048895 1.194 1 =BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
INTERCPT 1 -1.6818 0.5352 9.8749 0.0017 0.186
MALE 1 -0.2962 0.4712 0.3952 0.5296 -0.023096 0.744
WHITE 1 -0.0704 0.2721 0.0669 07959 -0.009305 0.932
BELOWZON 1 0.0835 0.3691 0.0511 0.8211 0.008136 1.087
MWC 1 0.2278 0.1449 2.4716 0.1159 0.057361 1.256
HIGHAVG 1 -0.1965 0.1314 2.2375 0.1347 -0.054082 0.822
-0.012975 0.951 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant =51.3% Somers' D = 0.104
Discordant =41.0% Gamma = 0.112
Tied = 7.7% Tau-a = 0.023
(499120 pairs) c = 0.552
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WARNING: 258 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covariates Chi -Square for Covanates
AIC 1071.775 1076.860
SC 1076.598 1110.623
-2 LOG L 1069.775 1062.860 6.915 with 6 DF(p=0.3288)
Score 7.055 with 6 DF(p=0.3 158)
Variable
USNA
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable







1 0.1826 0.1504 1.4736 0.2248 0.050273 1.200 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
INTERCPT 1 -1.2555 0.6137 4.1853 0.0408 0.285
WHITE 1 0.5253 0.5406 0.9442 0.3312 0.040154 1.691
BELOWZON 1 -0.1590 0.3960 0.1612 0.6881 -0.016554 0.853
MWC 1 -0.0151 0.1683 0.0081 0.9283 -0.003700 0.985
HIGHAVG 1 0.1018 0.2518 0.1635 0.6860 0.016779 1.107
TECH 1 -0.4750 0.2341 4.1191 0.0424 -0.083359 0.622
Concordant = 45.8% Somers' D = 0.095
Discordant = 36.2% Gamma = 0.116
Tied = 18.0% Tau-a = 0.038
(165984 pairs) c = 0.548
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WARNING: 673 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.















24.797 with 7 DF (p=0.0008)
25.035 with 7 DF (p=0.0007)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable








































-0.025285 0.559 I =MALE; 0=FEMALE
0.058665 1.968 1=WHITE; 0=OTHER
049608 1.729 1 =BELOW-ZONE:0=IN-ZONE
0.001995 1.008 1=MARRIED/CHILD:0=OTHERWISE
0.057212 1.231 1=H. AVERAGE;0=L. AVERAGE
0.116556 1.526 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
0.038797 1.172 1=USNA SOURCE; 0=OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant =53.8% Somers' D = 0.171
Discordant = 36.7% Gamma = 0.189
Tied = 9.5% Tau-a = 0.026
(1035804 pairs) c = 0.586
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APPENDIX D. CAPTAIN LOGITMODEL RESULTS
(BYDESIGNATORS)












WARNING: 543 observ ation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.







2 LOG L 1126.924 1060.576
Score
66.348 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
63.122 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald




































































Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses


































WARNING: 206 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 76.462 88.692
SC 80.208 118.662
2 LOG L 74.462 72.692 1.770with7DF(p=0.9715)
Score 18.043 with 7 DF(p=0.0 118)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable









1 -2.4738 7.5268 0.1080 0.7424
1 -0.0447 6.4256 0.0000 0.9945
0.084 Intercept
-0.001392 0.956 1=WHITE; 0=OTHER




































Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 75.7% Somers' D = 0.641
Discordant = 11.6% Gamma = 0.735
Tied = 12.8% Tau-a = 0.032
(2440 pairs) c = 0.820
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WARNING: 1277 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables










100.969 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
93.238 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
Variable
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 -2.3700 2.1037 1.2691 0.2599 0.093
MALE 1 -0.8012 2.0219 0.1570 0.6919 -0.011334 0.449
WHITE 1 1.2623 0.5048 6.2541 0.0124 0.071073 3.534
BELOWZON 1 1.3923 0.2392 33.8867 0.0001 0.166352 4.024
MWC 1 0.3235 0.1472 4.8326 0.0279 0.062554 1.382
HIGHAVG 1 -0.1898 0.1084 3.0687 0.0798 -0.050560 0.827
TECH 1 -0.2677 0.1085 6.0917 0.0136 -0.070254 0.765
USNA 1 -0.0484 0.1192 0.1650 0.6846 -0.011649 0.953










Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 54.9% Somers* D = 0.216
Discordant = 33.3% Gamma = 0.245
Tied =11.8% Tau-a = 0.108
(5751 18 pairs) c = 0.608
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WARNrNG: 54 1 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables















58.604 with 8 DF(p=0.0001)
54.355 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
Variable
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 -4.2661 1.6177 6.9548 0.0084 0.014
MALE 1 1.9884 1.4534 1.8717 0.1713 0.052114 7.304
WHITE 1 -0.2228 0.5532 0.1622 0.6872 -0.015342 0.800
BELOWZON 1 1.2305 0.3232 14.4944 0.0001 0.144402 3.423
MWC 1 0.3926 0.1939 4.0995 0.0429 0.077186 1.481
HIGHAVG 1 -0.2089 0.1423 2.1557 0.1420 -0.055803 0.811
TECH 1 -0.0454 0.1511 0.0902 0.7639 -0.011495 0.956
USNA 1 0.2754 0.1424 3.7389 0.0532 0.074417 1.317










Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant =55.9% Somers' D = 0.218
Discordant = 34. 1% Gamma = 0.242
Tied = 10.0% Tau-a = 0.105
(188 139 pairs) c = 0.609
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WARNING: 206 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.







-2 LOG L 385.893 350.759
Score
Chi-Square for Covanates
35.134 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
33.338 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate






















0.9328 0.3341 -0.066187 0.120 1=WHITE; 0OTHER
7.2139 0.0072 0.184689 3.603 I =BELOW-ZONE;0=IN-ZONE


























Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 64.7% Somers' D = 0.418
Discordant = 22.9% Gamma = 0.478
Tied = 12.4% Tau-a = 0.179
(20832 pairs) c = 0.709
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WARNING: 1273 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables

















-2 LOG L 2092.086 1976.331
Score
115.755with8DF(p=O0001)
104.549 with 8 DF (p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Paramete Standard Wald






















































0.980 1=H. AVERAGE; 0=L. AVERAGE
0.869 1 =BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
1.113 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE
6.525 1=GOODPERFORM;0=OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant =55.1% Somers' D = 0.220
Discordant =33 1% Gamma = 0.249
Tied =11.8% Tau-a = 0.108
(572572 pairs) c = 0.610
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WARNING: 54 1 observation(s) were deleted due to missing vaiues for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessmg Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 170.013 181.709
SC 174.798 219.985
-2LOGL 168.013 165.709 2.304 with 7 DF (p=0.9411)
Score 5.951 with 7 DF(p=0.5455)







Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized




















1 0.3943 0.5398 0.5336 0.4651












0.162089 1.834 1=H. AVERAGE;0=L AVERAGE
0.099864 1.483 1 =BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
0.1886 0.180589 1.951 1=USNA SOURCE: 0=OTHERWlSE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 57.6% Somers' D = 0.311
Discordant = 26.5% Gamma = 0.370
Tied = 15.9% Tau-a = 0.012
(14739 pairs) c = 0.656
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WARNING: 206 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory- variables.
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 35.857 45.342
SC 39.603 71.565
-2LOGL 33.857 31.342 2.515 with 6 DF(p=0.8668)
Score . 2.902with6DF(p=0.8210)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood tstimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized












-0.8553 10.4080 0.0068 0.9345 -0.026653 0.425 1 =WHITE; 0=OTHER
0.7181 2.2583 0.1011 0.7505 0.103467 2.051
1.2356 1.5987 0.5973 0.4396 0.249980 3.440
-0.9243 1.5414 0.3595 0.5488 -0.198309 0.397
-1.4947 1.3203 1.2817 0.2576 -0.390621 0.224
-0.6432 1.2988 0.2453 0.6204 -0.170925 0.526






Concordant = 72.3% Somers' D = 0.640
Discordant = 8.3% Gamma = 0.794
Tied = 19.5% Tau-a = 0.012
(930 pairs) c = 0.820
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TABLE D.9 LOGIT RESULTS FOR CAPTAIN PERFORMANCE MODEL
(PILOT OFFICERS)
Data Set: WORK ONE
Response Variable: PERFORM
Response Levels: 2







WARNING: 1273 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 372.105 372.565
SC 377.433 415.192
-2 LOG L 370.105 356.565
Score
13.540 with 7 DF (p=0.0600)
13.455 with 7 DF(p=0.0618)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
















































1=H. AVERAGE; 1=L. AVERAGE
1 =BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 56.2% Somers' D = 0.276
Discordant = 28.6% Gamma = 0.325
Tied = 15.2% Tau-a = 0.014
(59320 pairs) c = 0.638
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APPENDIX E. COMMANDER LOGITMODEL RESULTS
(BELOW-ZONE PROMOTION)












WARNING: 30 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables




Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates
AIC 284.628 289.845
SC 287.946 316.390
-2LOGL 282.628 273.845 8.783 with 7 DF (p=0.2686)
Score 8.482 with 7 DF (p=0.2920)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable

























0.2438 0.6215 2.889 Intercept
-0.058208 0.221 1=MALE; 0=FEMALE
0.099599 2.405 1=WHITE; 0=OTHER
-0.170308 0.493 1=MARRIED/CH1LD:0=OTHERWISE
0.015780 1.065 1=H. AVERAGE:0=L. AVERAGE
0.014261 1.054 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
0.036326 1.142 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE













Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 55.9% Somers' D = 0.191
Discordant = 36.9% Gamma = 0.205
Tied = 7.2% Tau-a = 0.096
(10395 pairs) c = 0.595
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TABLE E2 LOGITRESULTS FOR COMMANDER PROMOTIONMODEL
(BELOW-ZONE PROMOTION)
Data Set: WORK ONE
Response Variable: PROMOTE
Response Levels: 2







WARNING: 30 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates
AIC 48.963 57.983
SC 52.281 84.528
-2 LOG L 46.963 41.983 4.980 with 7 DF (p=0.6624)
Score 5.472 with 7 DF(p=0.6026)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized














1 -2.2695 6.5809 0.1189 0.7302 -0.087604 0.103 1=MALE; 0=FEMALE




































Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 74.8% Somers' D = 0.581
Discordant = 16.7% Gamma = 0.635
Tied = 8.5% Tau-a = 0.028
(995 pairs) c = 0.790
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WARNING: 30 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessmg Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates
AIC 172.370 179.406
SC 175.688 202.632
-2 LOG L 170.370 165.406 4.964 with 6 DF (p=0.5484)
Score 5.118with6DF(p=0.5288)
Variable
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label























0.5025 0.074293 6.853 1=MALE; 0=FEMALE
0.5101 -0.072772 0.527 1=WHITE; 0OTHER
0.1855 -0.149908 0.537 1=MARRIED/CHILD;0=OTHERWISE
0.2476 0.128982 1.678 1=H. AVERAGE;0=L. AVERAGE
0.7266 0.039657 1.156 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
0.1557 -0.158171 0.560 1=USNA SOURCE; 0=OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 57.4% Somers' D = 0.241
Discordant = 33.3% Gamma = 0.266
Tied = 9.3% Tau-a = 0.061
(5220 pairs) c = 0.621
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APPENDIX F. COMMANDER LOGITMODEL RESULTS
(IN-ZONE PROMOTION)
TABLE F. I LOGIT RESULTS FOR COMMANDER SCREENED FOR COMMAND MODEL
(IN-ZONE PROMOTION)
Data Set: WORK ONE
Response Variable: XOSCREEN
Response Levels: 2







WARNING: 6961 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables




Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 8033.155 7933.782
SC 8039.934 7988.009
-2LOGL 8031.155 7917.782 1 13.373 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Score 116.528 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 0.9332 0.3070 9.2408 0.0024 2.543
MALE 1 -1.2448 0.2730 20.7850 0.0001 -0.068334 0.288
WHITE 1 -0.5480 0.1453 14.2318 0.0002 -0.055968 0.578
MWC 1 0.0297 0.0615 0.2337 0.6288 0.007220 1.030
HIGHAVG 1 0.00470 0.0548 0.0074 0.9316 0.001279 1.005
TECH 1 -0.2958 0.0548 29.1295 0.0001 -0.081104 0.744
USNA 1 0.3679 0.0588 39.0776 0.0001 0.093712 1.445









Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 53.0% Somers' D = 0.147
Discordant = 38.3% Gamma = 0.161
Tied = 8.8% Tau-a = 0.063
(9003872 pairs) c = 0.573
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WARNING: 6960 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covariates
AIC 8177.181 7950.714
SC 8183.959 8004.941
-2LOGL 8175.181 7934.714 240.467 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Score 235.139 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Vanable








0.055201 1.357 l=GOOD PERFORM:0=OTHERWISE
INTERCPT 1 0.4297 0.3033 2.0073 0.1565 1.537
MALE 1 -0.4293 0.2698 2.5332 0.1115 -0.023567 0.651
WHITE 1 0.1027 0.1435 0.5123 0.4741 0.010490 1.108
MWC 1 0.2989 0.0607 24.2099 0.0001 0.072600 1.348
H1GHAVG 1 0.4402 0.0541 66.1544 0.0001 0.119780 1.553
TECH 1 -0.1330 0.0541 6.0351 0.0140 -0 036468 0.875
USNA 1 0.6286 0.0581 116.9565 0.0001 0.160150 1.875
PERFORM 1 0.3051 0.0812 14.1042 0.0002
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 57.9% Somers' D = 0.226
Discordant = 35.3% Gamma = 0.243
Tied = 6.9% Tau-a = 0.099
(9227592 pairs) c = 0.613
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WARNING: 6960 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables







-2 LOG L 4835.517 4771.499
Score
64.018 with 6 DF(p=0.0001)
64.094 with 6 DF (p=0.0001
)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 -2.4331 0.4323 31.6731 0.0001 0.088 Intercept






















0.5136 -0.013791 0.778 1 =MALE; 0=FEMALE
0.3390 0.019978 1.216 1=WHITE; 0=OTHER
0.3805 0.018445 1.079 1 =MARRIED/CHILD;0=OTHERWISE
0.0005 0.072543 1.305 1=H. AVERAGE;0=L. AVERAGE
0.0001 0.117054 1.533 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
0.0018 0.065956 1.295 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 53.6% Somers' D = 0.175
Discordant =36.1% Gamma = 0.195
Tied = 10.3% Tau-a = 0.038
(4539712 pairs) c = 0.587
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APPENDIX G CAPTAIN LOGITMODEL RESUL TS
(BELOW-ZONE PROMOTION)












WARNING: 61 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory- variables.







-2 LOG L 86.548 75.212
Score
Chi-Square for Covanates
11.336 with 7 DF(p=0. 1246)
16.208 with 7 DF (p=0.0233)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald
Estimate Error Chi-Square
Pr > Standardized Odds
Chi-Square Estimate Ratio
INTERCPT 1 -5.2777 6.0327 0.7654 0.3817 0.005
MALE 1 -1.2711 3.5690 0.1268 0.7217 -0.059228 0.281
WHITE 1 -1.4748 3.5124 0.1763 0.6746 -0.068718 0.229
MWC 1 -0.4664 0.8548 0.2977 0.5853 -0.090304 0.627
HIGHAVG 1 -1.0458 0.6161 2.8815 0.0896 -0.289067 0.351
TECH 1 -0.7831 0.6445 1.4763 0.2244 -0.199883 0.457
USNA 1 0.8195 0.6138 1.7826 0.1818 0.225578 2.269










0.520938 999.000 l=GOOD PERFORM;0=OTHERW1SE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 68.9% Somers' D = 0.468
Discordant = 22.0% Gamma = 0.515
Tied = 9.1% Tau-a = 0.079
(1651 pairs) c = 0.734
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WARNING: 60 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.

















9.380 with 7 DF (p=0.2265)
22.131 with 7 DF(p=0.0024)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
INTERCPT 1 -14.6975 8.0599 3.3253 0.0682 0.000
MALE 1 -0.8771 4.7688 0.0338 0.8541 -0.040724 0.416
WHITE 1 -0.4817 4.6927 0.0105 0.9182 -0.022367 0.618
MWC 1 -1.1346 1.1411 0.9886 0.3201 -0.219023 0.322
HIGHAVG 1 -0.7860 0.8215 0.9156 0.3386 -0.217321 0.456
TECH 1 0.7439 0.8601 0.7481 0.3871 0.189504 2.104
USNA 1 0.7264 0.8186 0.7875 0.3749 0.199818 2.068








Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 68.0% Somers' D = 0.509
Discordant = 17.2% Gamma = 0.597
Tied = 14.8% Tau-a = 0.048
(938 pairs) c = 0.754
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WARNING: 60 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
intercept and
Criterion Only Covariates Chi-Square for Covariates
AIC 13,890 24,443
SC 16.839 45.085
-2 LOG L 11.890 10.443 1.447 with 6 DF(p=0.9629)
Score 2.108 with 6 DF(p=0.9095)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio
INTERCPT 1 6.1979 17.0160 0.1327 0.7157 491.71
MALE 1 -0.0509 12.3438 0.0000 0.9967 -0.002362 0.950
WHITE 1 -1,8424 12,1459 0.0230 0,8794 -0,085542 0,158
MWC 1 -1.4705 2.9511 0.2483 0.6183 -0.283869 0.230
HIGHAVG 1 1.5933 2.1221 0.5637 0.4528 0440495 4.920
TECH 1 1.2723 2.2237 0.3273 0.5672 0.324091 3.569










Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 80,7% Somers' D = 0,807
Discordant = 0.0% Gamma = 1.000
Tied = 19.3% Tau-a = 0.011
(140 parrs) c = 0.904
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APPENDIX H. CAPTAIN LOGITMODEL RESULTS
(IN-ZONE PROMOTION)












WARNING: 1965 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and
Criterion Only Covanates Chi-Square for Covanates
AIC 3450.147 3346.766
SC 3456.000 3393.591
-2LOGL 3448.147 3330.766 117.381 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Score . . 113.495 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable


































0.1792 -0.029974 0.142 1=MALE; 0=FEMALE
0.0191 0.052287 2.419 1=WHITE; 0=OTHER
0.0109 0.056889 1.338 1=MARRIED/CHILD;0=OTHERWISE
0.4401 0.017584 1.067 1=H AVERAGE;0=L. AVERAGE
0.1603 0.031586 1.126 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
0.0001 0.105323 1.497 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERW1SE
0.0001 0.182591 9.139 l=GOOD PERFORM;0=OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 53.4% Somers' D = 0.178
Discordant = 35.6% Gamma = 0.200
Tied =11.0% Tau-a = 0.085
(1579640 pairs) c = 0.589
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WARNING: 1960 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.
Criteria for Assessing Model Fit
Intercept
Intercept and





98.013 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
93.141 with 7 DF(p=0.0001)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized









































1.035 1=H. AVERAGE:0=L AVERAGE
1.8137 0.1781 -0.029808 0.894 1=BIO/MTH/ENG;0=SOC/BUS/HUM
0.3045 0.0851 12.7908 0.0003 0.079545 1.356 1=USNA SOURCE; 0OTHERWISE
1.9978 0.2665 56.1860 0.0001 0.164708 7.373 l=GOOD PERFORM;0=OTHERWISE
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Concordant = 52.7% Somers' D = 0.161
Discordant = 36.6% Gamma = 0.181
Tied = 10.8% Tau-a = 0.079
(1634754 pairs) c = 0.581
16












WARNING: 1960 observation(s) were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory variables.












13.788 with 6 DF(p=0.0321)
16.643 with 6 DF(p=0.0 107)
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard Wald Pr> Standardized Odds Variable
Variable DF Estimate Error Chi-Square Chi-Square Estimate Ratio Label
InterceptINTERCPT 1 2.2869 4.8918 0.2186 0.6401 9.844
MALE 1 -1.4816 4.7428 0.0976 0.7547 -0.022743 0.227
WHITE 1 2.0575 1.2304 2.7962 0.0945 0.121653 7.826
MWC 1 0.4906 0.3725 1.7349 0.1878 0.095991 1.633
HIGHAVG 1 0.7937 0.2726 8.4749 0.0036 0.215892 2.211
TECH 1 0.0734 0.2754 0.0710 0.7899 0.019552 1.076
USNA 1 0.4032 0.2822 2.0408 0.1531 0.105317 1.497
Concordant = 57.0% Somers' D = 0.276
Discordant = 29 3% Gamma = 0.320
Tied = 13.7% Tau-a = 0.012
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